Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization
Download Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages.
Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization
Author: David W.K. Yeung
language: en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date: 2011-12-06
Various imperfections in existing market systems prevent the free market from serving as a truly efficient allocation mechanism, but optimization of economic activities provides an effective remedial measure. Cooperative optimization claims that socially optimal and individually rational solutions to decision problems involving strategic action over time exist. To ensure that cooperation will last throughout the agreement period, however, the stringent condition of subgame consistency is required. This textbook presents a study of subgame consistent economic optimization, developing game-theoretic optimization techniques to establish the foundation for an effective policy menu to tackle the suboptimal behavior that the conventional market mechanism fails to resolve.
Subgame Consistent Cooperation
Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of subgame consistency in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this “classic” problem in game theory. This book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent dynamic cooperation covering the up-to-date state of the art analyses in this important topic. It sets out to provide the theory, solution techniques and applications of subgame consistent cooperation in a wide spectrum of paradigms for analysis which includes cooperative dynamic game models with stochastic state dynamics, with uncertain future payoffs, with asynchronous players’ horizons, with random cooperation duration, with control spaces switching and with transferable and nontransferable payoffs. The book would be a significant research reference text for researchers in game theory, economists, applied mathematicians, policy-makers, corporate decision-makers, and graduate students in applied mathematics, game theory, decision sciences, economics and management sciences.
Frontiers in Games and Dynamic Games
This contributed volume presents the state-of-the-art of games and dynamic games, featuring several chapters based on plenary sessions at the ISDG-China Chapter Conference on Dynamic Games and Game Theoretic Analysis, which was held from August 3-5, 2017 at the Ningbo campus of the University of Nottingham, China. The chapters in this volume will provide readers with paths to further research, serving as a testimony to the vitality of the field. Experts cover a range of theory and applications related to games and dynamic games, with topics including: Dynamically stable cooperative provision of public goods under non-transferable utility Strongly time-consistent solutions in cooperative dynamic games Incentive Stackelberg games for stochastic systems Static and inverse Stackelberg games in political economy Cournot and Betrand competition on symmetric R&D networks Numerical Nash equilibria using curvilinear multistart algorithm Markov chain approximation numerical scheme for infinite-horizon mean field games Frontiers in Games and Dynamic Games will appeal to an interdisciplinary audience of researchers, practitioners, and graduate students interested in games and dynamic games.