Putting Logic In Its Place

Putting Logic in its Place

What role, if any, does formal logic play in characterizing epistemically rational belief? Traditionally, belief is seen in a binary way - either one believes a proposition, or one doesn't. Given this picture, it is attractive to impose certain deductive constraints on rational belief: that one's beliefs be logically consistent, and that one believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. A less popular picture sees belief as a graded phenomenon. This picture (explored more by decision-theorists and philosophers of science thatn by mainstream epistemologists) invites the use of probabilistic coherence to constrain rational belief. But this latter project has often involved defining graded beliefs in terms of preferences, which may seem to change the subject away from epistemic rationality. Putting Logic in its Place explores the relations between these two ways of seeing beliefs. It argues that the binary conception, although it fits nicely with much of our commonsense thought and talk about belief, cannot in the end support the traditional deductive constraints on rational belief. Binary beliefs that obeyed these constraints could not answer to anything like our intuitive notion of epistemic rationality, and would end up having to be divorced from central aspects of our cognitive, practical, and emotional lives. But this does not mean that logic plays no role in rationality. Probabilistic coherence should be viewed as using standard logic to constrain rational graded belief. This probabilistic constraint helps explain the appeal of the traditional deductive constraints, and even underlies the force of rationally persuasive deductive arguments. Graded belief cannot be defined in terms of preferences. But probabilistic coherence may be defended without positing definitional connections between beliefs and preferences. Like the traditional deductive constraints, coherence is a logical ideal that humans cannot fully attain. Nevertheless, it furnishes a compelling way of understanding a key dimension of epistemic rationality.

Putting Logic in Its Place

Putting Psychology in its Place

This fourth edition of Putting Psychology in Its Place builds on the previous three in introducing the history of Psychology and placing the discipline within its historical and social contexts. Written by esteemed Psychologists Graham Richards and Paul Stenner, this crucial text aims both to answer and raise questions about the role of Psychology in modern society by critically examining issues such as how Psychology developed and why psychoanalysis had such an impact. It discusses enduring underlying conceptual problems and examines how the discipline has changed to deal with contemporary social issues such as religion, race and gender. The fourth edition features revised and updated chapters, though the core structure remains unchanged. The final chapter has been restructured and jointly re-written. This text was written to remain compatible with the British Psychological Society requirements for undergraduate courses and is imaginatively written and accessible to all. Putting Psychology in Its Place is an invaluable introductory text for undergraduate students of the history of Psychology and will also appeal to postgraduates, academics and anyone interested in Psychology or the history of science.