Platonism And The Objects Of Science
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Platonism and the Objects of Science
Author: Scott Berman
language: en
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
Release Date: 2020-02-20
What are the objects of science? Are they just the things in our scientific experiments that are located in space and time? Or does science also require that there be additional things that are not located in space and time? Using clear examples, these are just some of the questions that Scott Berman explores as he shows why alternative theories such as Nominalism, Contemporary Aristotelianism, Constructivism, and Classical Aristotelianism, fall short. He demonstrates why the objects of scientific knowledge need to be not located in space or time if they are to do the explanatory work scientists need them to do. The result is a contemporary version of Platonism that provides us with the best way to explain what the objects of scientific understanding are, and how those non-spatiotemporal things relate to the spatiotemporal things of scientific experiments, as well as everything around us, including even ourselves.
Platonism and the Objects of Science
"What are the objects of science? Are they just the spatiotemporal things? Or does science also require non-spatiotemporal things? Are the objects of science discovered or created? And what are the implications for ethics and aesthetics? These are just some of the questions that Scott Berman explores in Platonism and the Objects of Science , in which he argues that a Platonic explanation of these objects is the most convincing one. Arguing that other theories which attempt to explain the nature of being - including Nominalism, Contemporary Aristotelianism, Constructivism, and Classical Aristotelianism - fall short of a Platonist explanation, Berman demonstrates how according to a Platonic conception of existence, non-spatiotemporal things constitute the best objects for understanding the spatiotemporal things. Using a contemporary Platonic approach to these issues allows us to understand in the best way what material objects are, what laws of nature are, what possibilities are, and what truths are. Written in a clear and jargon-free style, Platonism and the Objects of Science will be suitable for those interested in Platonic theory, metaphysics, and contemporary philosophical thought."--
Autonomy Platonism and the Indispensability Argument
Author: Russell Marcus
language: en
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC
Release Date: 2015-06-11
Mathematical platonism is the view that mathematical statements are true of real mathematical objects like numbers, shapes, and sets. One central problem with platonism is that numbers, shapes, sets, and the like are not perceivable by our senses. In contemporary philosophy, the most common defense of platonism uses what is known as the indispensability argument. According to the indispensabilist, we can know about mathematics because mathematics is essential to science. Platonism is among the most persistent philosophical views. Our mathematical beliefs are among our most entrenched. They have survived the demise of millennia of failed scientific theories. Once established, mathematical theories are rarely rejected, and never for reasons of their inapplicability to empirical science. Autonomy Platonism and the Indispensability Argument is a defense of an alternative to indispensability platonism. The autonomy platonist believes that mathematics is independent of empirical science: there is purely mathematical evidence for purely mathematical theories which are even more compelling to believe than empirical science. Russell Marcus begins by contrasting autonomy platonism and indispensability platonism. He then argues against a variety of indispensability arguments in the first half of the book. In the latter half, he defends a new approach to a traditional platonistic view, one which includes appeals to a priori but fallible methods of belief acquisition, including mathematical intuition, and a natural adoption of ordinary mathematical methods. In the end, Marcus defends his intuition-based autonomy platonism against charges that the autonomy of mathematics is viciously circular. This book will be useful to researchers, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates with interests in the philosophy of mathematics or in the connection between science and mathematics.