Epistemic Thought Experiments And Intuitions
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Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions
This work investigates intuitions' nature, demonstrating how philosophers can best use them in epistemology. First, the author considers several paradigmatic thought experiments in epistemology that depict the appeal to intuition. He then argues that the nature of thought experiment-generated intuitions is not best explained by an a priori Platonism. Second, the book instead develops and argues for a thin conception of epistemic intuitions. The account maintains that intuition is neither a priori nor a posteriori but multi-dimensional. It is an intentional but non-propositional mental state that is also non-conceptual and non-phenomenal in nature. Moreover, this state is individuated by its progenitor, namely, the relevant thought experiment. Third, the author provides an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of epistemic intuition. The suggestion is the fitting-ness approach: intuition alone has no epistemic status. Rather, intuition has evidentiary value as long as it fits well with other pieces into a whole, namely, the pertinent thought experiment. Finally, the book addresses the key challenges raised by supporters of anti-centrality, according to which philosophers do not regard intuition as central evidence in philosophy. To that end, the author responds to them, showing that they fail to affect the account of intuition developed in this book.This text appeals to students and researchers working in epistemology. .
Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions
This work investigates intuitions' nature, demonstrating how philosophers can best use them in epistemology. First, the author considers several paradigmatic thought experiments in epistemology that depict the appeal to intuition. He then argues that the nature of thought experiment-generated intuitions is not best explained by an a priori Platonism. Second, the book instead develops and argues for a thin conception of epistemic intuitions. The account maintains that intuition is neither a priori nor a posteriori but multi-dimensional. It is an intentional but non-propositional mental state that is also non-conceptual and non-phenomenal in nature. Moreover, this state is individuated by its progenitor, namely, the relevant thought experiment. Third, the author provides an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of epistemic intuition. The suggestion is the fitting-ness approach: intuition alone has no epistemic status. Rather, intuition has evidentiary value as long as it fits well with other pieces into a whole, namely, the pertinent thought experiment. Finally, the book addresses the key challenges raised by supporters of anti-centrality, according to which philosophers do not regard intuition as central evidence in philosophy. To that end, the author responds to them, showing that they fail to affect the account of intuition developed in this book. This text appeals to students and researchers working in epistemology.
Epistemology Futures
Author: Stephen Cade Hetherington
language: en
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Release Date: 2006
How might epistemology build upon its past and present, so_ as to be better in the future? Epistemology Futures _ takes bold steps towards answering that question. What _ methods will best serve epistemology? Which phenomena and _ concepts deserve more attention from it? Are there _ approaches and assumptions that have impeded its progress _ until now? This volume contains provocative essays by _ prominent epistemologists, presenting many new ideas for _ possible improvements in how to do epistemology. Doubt is _ cast upon the powers of conceptual analysis and of _ epistemological intuition. Surprising aspects of knowledge_ are noticed. What is it? What is it not? Scepticism's limits are traced. What threatens us as potential knowers? What _ does not? The nature and special significance of inquiry, of normative virtues, of understanding, and of disagreement are elucidated, all with an eye on sharpening epistemology's _ future focus. There is definite insight and potential _ foresight. How might real epistemological progress occur in the future? Epistemology Futures offers some intriguing clues.