Wittgenstein On Internal And External Relations
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Wittgenstein on Internal and External Relations
Does Wittgenstein's method of analysis rest on the distinction between internal and external relations? Approaching Wittgenstein's writings from a new perspective, Wittgenstein on Internal and External Relations focuses on how Wittgenstein distinguishes between relations that are grounded in the nature of their related terms, internal, and those which belong to them accidentally, external. This original approach reveals the difference to be one of the most fundamental distinctions that Wittgenstein drew in his writings. Working chronologically, it summarizes the philosophical background against which the distinction emerged, addressing Hegel, Bradley, Russell and Moore. Dealing with Wittgenstein's early and later writings, it distils definitions of the notions of internal and external relations and offers its applications, before concluding with the rationale for Wittgenstein's method of analysis. Making a valuable contribution to Wittgenstein scholarship, Wittgenstein on Internal and External Relations presents significant new insights into his relationship with Russell and Moore and shows how internal and external relations inform his entire philosophical approach.
Wittgenstein on Thought and Will
This book examines in detail Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ideas on thought, thinking, will and intention, as those ideas developed over his lifetime. It also puts his ideas into context by a comparison both with preceding thinkers and with subsequent ones. The first chapter gives an account of the historical and philosophical background, discussing such thinkers as Plato, Descartes, Berkeley, Frege and Russell. The final chapter looks at the legacy of, and reactions to, Wittgenstein. These two chapters frame the central three chapters, devoted to Wittgenstein’s ideas on thought and will. Chapter 2 discusses the sense in which both thought and will represent, or are about, reality; Chapter 3 considers Wittgenstein’s critique of the picture of an "inner process", and the role that behaviour and context play in his views on thought and will; while Chapter 4 centres on the question "What sort of thing is it that thinks or wills?", in particular examining Wittgenstein’s ideas concerning the first person ("I") and concerning statements like "I am thinking" or "I intend to do X".
Kant, Wittgenstein, and the Performativity of Thought
This book explores the idea that there is a certain performativity of thought connecting Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. On this view, we make judgments and use propositions because we presuppose that our thinking is about something, and that our propositions have sense. Kant’s requirement of an a priori connection between intuitions and concepts is akin to Wittgenstein’s idea of the general propositional form as sharing a form with the world. Aloisia Moser argues that Kant speaks about acts of the mind, not about static categories. Furthermore, she elucidates the Tractatus’ logical form as a projection method that turns into a so-called ‘zero method’, whereby propositions are merely the scaffolding of the world. In so doing, Moser connects Kantian reflective judgment to Wittgensteinian rule-following. She thereby presents an account of performativity centering neither on theories nor methods, but on the application enacting them in the first place.