Who S In Charge Ownership And Conditionality In Imf Supported Programs
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Who's in Charge? Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs
Author: Mr.James M. Boughton
language: en
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Release Date: 2003-09-01
IMF lending is conditional on a country's commitment to carry out an agreed program of economic policies. Unless that commitment is genuine and broadly held, the likelihood of implementation will be poor. Is there a conflict between national commitment and conditional finance? Are national authorities or other agents in the country less likely to "own" a reform program simply because it is conditionally financed? This paper argues that potential conflicts are reduced when program design takes the country's interests and circumstances into account and when conditionality results from a genuine process of interaction between the IMF and the borrower.
Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs
Author: International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office
language: en
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Release Date: 2008-04-30
This evaluation examines factors influencing the effectiveness of the IMF structural conditionality in bringing about structural reform. It assesses the impact of the streamlining initiative launched in 2000 and of the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines. These guidelines aimed at reducing the volume and scope of structural conditionality by requiring “parsimony” in the use of conditions and stipulated that conditions must be “critical” to the achievement of the program goals. The evaluation finds that during the period 1995–2004, there was extensive use of structural conditionality in IMF-supported programs, with an average of 17 conditions per program/year.
IMF Conditionality
The twenty-one contributions in this book assess the controversy surrounding the Fund and provide judgments about the criteria for Fund lending which should help readers understand and analyze both its ongoing role in smoothing adjustment to international payments imbalances and its currently critical position in responding to the debt crisis.