Unbelievable Errors And Error Theory About All Normative Judgement
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Unbelievable Errors
Author: Bart Streumer
language: en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date: 2017-08-04
Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory. But he argues that it makes this error theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory and it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory. He then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory's truth and our ability to believe it.
The Architecture of Blame and Praise
Author: David Shoemaker
language: en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date: 2024-09-17
Many philosophers assume that to be a responsible agent is to be an apt target of responses like blame and praise. But what do these responses consist of, precisely? And do they really belong together, simply negative and positive symmetrical counterparts of each other? While there has been a lot of philosophical work on the nature of blame over the past 15 years--yielding multiple conflicting theories--there has been little on the nature of praise. Indeed, those few who have investigated praise--including both philosophers and psychologists--have concluded that it is quite different in some respects than blame, and that the two in fact may not be symmetrical counterparts at all. In this book, David Shoemaker offers the first detailed deep-dive into the complicated nature of blame and praise, teasing out their many varieties while defending a general symmetry between them. The book provides a thorough normative grounding for the many types and modes of blame and praise, albeit one that never appeals to desert or the metaphysics of free will. The volume draws from moral philosophy, moral psychology, the philosophy and psychology of humor, the psychology of personality disorders, and experimental economics. The many original contributions in the book include: the presentation and defense of a new functionalist theory of the entire interpersonal blame and praise system; the revelation of a heretofore unrecognized kind of blame; a discussion of how the capacities and impairments of narcissists tell an important story about the symmetrical structure of the blame/praise system; an investigation into the blame/praise emotions and their aptness conditions; an exploration into the key differences between other-blame and self-blame; and an argument drawn from economic games for why desert is unnecessary to render apt the ways in which blame sometimes sanctions.
Truth Without Truths
Author: David Liggins
language: en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date: 2024-09-14
In the context of debates about truth, nihilism is the view that nothing is true. This is a very striking and (at first) implausible thesis, which is perhaps why it is seldom discussed. Truth without Truths applies nihilism to the philosophical debates on truth and paradox, and explores how a nihilist approach to truth is a serious contender. David Liggins demonstrates that a strong case for nihilism about truth is available. The main grounds for taking nihilism on truth seriously are the solutions it provides to a wide range of paradoxes involving truth, and its epistemological superiority to theories that posit truths. The discussion considers a wider range of paradoxes than usual-including the truth-teller paradox and other paradoxes of underdetermination. Liggins shows how the debate over truth and paradox can be advanced by drawing on metaphysical debates about realism and anti-realism. Truth without Truths is also a challenge to deflationism. Deflationists provide an austere, metaphysically lightweight account of truth. But there is one posit that all contemporary deflationists make: they posit truths. By showing that we can well do without truths, Liggins argues that deflationism is actually too lavish a position. Liggins's preferred form of alethic nihilism includes a Ramseyan analysis of the concept of truth, which uses quantification into sentence position, conceived of as non-objectual and non-substitutional. This book is part of a wider movement exploring the implications of admitting forms of non-objectual, non-substitutional quantification-sometimes called 'higher-order metaphysics'.