Unbelievable Errors An Error Theory About All Normative Judgements
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Unbelievable Errors
Author: Bart Streumer
language: en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date: 2017-08-04
Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory. But he argues that it makes this error theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory and it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory. He then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory's truth and our ability to believe it.
Unbelievable Errors
Author: Bart Streumer
language: en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date: 2017-08-11
In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory says that these judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that these properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory, but he argues that it is not. Instead, he argues, our inability to believe this error theory makes the theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory, it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory, and it undermines revisionary alternatives to the theory. Streumer then sketches how certain other philosophical views can be defended in a similar way, and how philosophers should modify their method if there can be true theories that we cannot believe. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we should sharply distinguish the truth of a theory from our ability to believe it
The Good, the Right, and the Real: Is Value a Fact?
Author: David Baggett
language: en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date: 2025-09-03
The book argues for a strongly objective understanding of ethics. Positive arguments in its favor are discussed and anticipated objections are answered. Alternatives to objectivist views of ethics are considered at length. Among such views include that all moral claims are false; that no moral sentences express truth claims; and that moral judgments derive their truth from the preferences or sentiments of human beings. Having argued for a strongly objectivist understanding of morality, the case is made that God deserves to be taken seriously as a contender for its best explanation.