Two Arguments For The Identity Of Indiscernibles
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Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles
Author: Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
language: en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date: 2022-08-25
The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is the thesis that, necessarily, no two (concrete) objects differ only numerically. This is the weakest version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that there is no trivial version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, since what is usually known as the trivial version of the principle is consistent with objects differing only numerically. He provides two positive arguments for the Principle: one based on broadly Humean considerations excluding a certain kind of necessary connection between distinct objects, and the other based on ideas about what grounds the having of certain properties by objects. This book also presents two new arguments against restricted versions of the principle according to which, necessarily, no two objects can be purely qualitatively indiscernible or intrinsically purely qualitatively indiscernible. It is further argued that one of the arguments for the weakest version of the principle can be extended to abstract objects. The conclusion is drawn that, necessarily, there are no objects, whether abstract or concrete, that differ only numerically.
Leibniz's Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles
Author: Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
language: en
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Release Date: 2014-08-14
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra presents an original study of the place and role of the Identity of Indiscernibles in Leibniz's philosophy. The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles rules out numerically distinct but perfectly similar things; Leibniz derived it from more basic principles and used it to establish important philosophical theses. Rodriguez-Pereyra aims to establish what Leibniz meant by the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, what his arguments for and from it were, and to assess those arguments and Leibniz's claims about the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. He argues that Leibniz had a very strong version of the principle, according to which no possibilia (whether or not they belong to the same possible world) are intrinsically perfectly similar, where this excludes things that differ in magnitude alone. The book discusses Leibniz's arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles in the Meditation on the Principle of the Individual, the Discourse on Metaphysics, Notationes Generales, Primary Truths, the letter to Casati of 1689, the correspondence with Clarke, as well as the use of the Identity of Indiscernibles in Leibniz's arguments against the Cartesian conception of the material world, atoms, absolute space and time, the Lockean conception of the mind as a tabula rasa, and freedom of indifference. Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that the Identity of Indiscernibles was a central but inessential principle of Leibniz's philosophy.
Spinoza’s Argument for Substance Monism
Author: Christopher Martin
language: en
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
Release Date: 2023-11-13
In Spinoza’s Argument for Substance Monism: Why There Is Only One Thing, Christopher Martin provides an interpretation and defense of this argument, using speculative metaphysics as a method to show how the key terms and concepts are employed and fit together. Specifically, Martin argues that (i) Spinoza’s understanding of substance and attribute departs only slightly from dominant historic notions; (ii) his definition of God in terms of attributes instead of perfections is quite helpful and (mostly) compatible with more traditional definitions; and (iii) Spinoza’s pairing of causal and conceptual relations is more intuitive than we think. Martin also shows how these essences function as causes and explains why, with Spinoza’s understanding of emanation and conceptual independence, any substance must have every attribute. These features of Spinoza’s argument explain and defend his ultimate claim that God/Nature is the only substantial being in existence. This book demonstrates how approachable and compelling Spinoza’s argument is and illustrates the practice and potential of speculative metaphysics for specialists and non-specialists alike.