Thought Experiments And Personal Identity
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Real People
Author: Kathleen V. Wilkes
language: en
Publisher: Oxford University Press on Demand
Release Date: 1993
This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of person-a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing that it engenders inconclusive and unconvincing results, and that truth is stranger than fiction. She then examines an assortment of real-life conditions, including infancy, insanity and dementia, dissociated states, and split brains. The popular faith in continuity of consciousness, and the unityof the person is subjected to sustained criticism. The author concludes with a look at different views of the person found in Homer, Aristotle, the post-Cartesians, and contemporary cognitive science.
Real People
Author: Kathleen V. Wilkes
language: en
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Release Date: 1988
A study of the scope and limits of the concept of a person, covering methodology of thought-experimentation, real-life conditions such as infancy, insanity and dementia, and looking at different views of the person found in Homer, Aristotle, the post-Cartesians and contemporary cognitive science.
Locke on Personal Identity
Author: Galen Strawson
language: en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date: 2014-07-21
John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In this book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke’s critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke’s use of the word "person" as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word "conscious." When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.