The Western Allies And Soviet Potential In World War Ii
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The Western Allies and Soviet Potential in World War II
World War II was the largest and most devastating war in modern history with far-reaching consequences. The single most important campaign was the Soviet–German war, which consumed the lion share of Germany’s military resources. In contrast to the tone in German and Anglo-American precampaign assessments, the USSR ws able to repulse the invasion after huge losses and turn the table on Germany and her minor Axis allies. This book examines how the two most important Western Allies in World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom, assessed the economic and military potential of the Soviet Union in 1939–1945. Since the USSR was the single most important military contributor to the Allied victory in Europe, and the main target of Germany’s military strength, these assessments are of paramount importance in order to understand how the Anglo-Americans perceived the overall war situation and adjusted their own war effort in accordance with it. Utilising a wide range of documents produced by the Anglo-Americans during and shortly before World War II, this book explores why Soviet strength was underestimated, and how the Soviet economic system, Soviet society and military capabilities were viewed by Western Government observers. The Western Allies and Soviet Potential in World War II is a fascinating read for those in academia studying economic history, international economics and security studies, especially areas on military and strategic.
The Anglo-Soviet Alliance
Author: Colin Turbett
language: en
Publisher: Pen and Sword Military
Release Date: 2021-04-14
Considers the inter-war and wartime relationship between Britain and the USSR and its impact on the attitudes of ordinary citizens. From the onset of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Britain enjoyed an ambiguous relationship with the USSR and its people. All inter-war governments were concerned about the communist ideals of the new state and the threat they presented to British interests at home and abroad, and this was inevitably reflected amongst the general population. However there was a well-established British Communist Party whose fortunes were tied to the Soviet Union’s successes and failures. The wartime alliance offered the Communists an opportunity to extend their influence and win electoral support. Or did it? There were influences at work stemming from both sides that sought to put the importance of allied victory above competing ideology, with agreement over the need for a strong and unconditional anti-Fascist alliance. Compromises were made and relationships formed that would have seemed strange indeed to the pre-war observer. There were, however, tensions throughout the period of the war. By mid-1945, the alliance was threatened by differences that reflected original ideologies that had been glossed over for the duration of the conflict: these led to a Cold War for the next 45 years. This book, using both contemporary sources as well as post-war analyses, examines these matters alongside images that take us back to the period and help us understand its intricacies. It will start with a look at Britain’s opposition to the Bolshevik Revolution and the consolidation of the Soviet State under Lenin and then Stalin. The main body of the book goes on to give detail of the Wartime Alliance and the various forms through which it was expressed – from Government led Lend-Lease of equipment, to voluntary 'Aid for Russia. t ends with the War’s aftermath and the division of the world between the influences of capitalism on the one hand, and the “really existing socialism” of the Soviet Union and its satellites on the other. Tensions and expectations resulted, amongst other great social events, in the launch of the Welfare State, the demise of the British Empire, the nuclear arms race and, ultimately, the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Arms for Russia & The Naval War in the Arctic, 1941–1945
This major new work fundamentally reassesses the operations by the Western allies to deliver war supplies to Russia via the Arctic sea route between 1941 and 1945. It explores the motives underpinning Western aid, its real impact on the Soviet war effort, and its influence on wider Allied and German strategy as the war developed. It brings to life key participants, political and military, describes the interaction of intelligence with high policy and tactics, and brings a fresh perspective to key events, including the notorious convoy PQ 17. The book disputes the long-standing view that aid to Russia was essentially discretionary, lacking military rationale and undertaken primarily to meet political objectives, with only a minor impact on Soviet war potential. It shows that aid was always grounded in strategic necessity, with the Arctic supply route a constant preoccupation of British and American leaders, absorbing perhaps twenty per cent of Royal Navy resources after 1941 and a significant share of Allied merchant shipping badly needed in other theaters. The Soviet claim, determinedly promoted through the Cold War, that aid was marginal, still influences attitudes in Vladimir Putin’s Russia and contemporary Western opinion. It even resonates through the present war in Ukraine. Andrew Boyd demonstrates that in reality, Western aid through the Arctic was a critical multiplier of Soviet military power throughout the war and perhaps even enabled Russia’s very survival in 1942; and he makes plain that the British contribution to the aid effort was greater than generally acknowledged. The book also emphasises that the Arctic conflict was not framed solely by the supply convoys, important though they were. British, German and Russian operations in a theater – defined by Adolph Hitler in early 1942 as the ‘zone of destiny’ – were shaped by other perceived opportunities and threats. For instance, Germany concentrated its fleet in Norway to forestall a potential British attack while attempting land offensives to cut Russia’s links with its northern ports. It also had vital raw materials to protect. Britain explored potential operations with Russia to dislodge Germany from the Arctic coast and sever her access to important resources. Elegantly written written and incorporating many new perspectives on the Arctic theater, this new work should find a place on the shelves of every historian, scholar and enthusiast whose interests extend to the Russian dimension of the Second World War.