The Concept Of Logical Consequence
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The Concept of Logical Consequence
Of course we all know now that mathematics has proved that logic doesn't really make sense, but Etchemendy (philosophy, Stanford Univ.) goes further and challenges the received view of the conceptual underpinnings of modern logic by arguing that Tarski's model-theoretic analysis of logical consequences is wrong. He may have found the soft underbelly of the dead horse. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
The Concept of Logical Consequence
The Concept of Logical Consequence is a critical evaluation of the model-theoretic and proof-theoretic characterizations of logical consequence that proceeds from Alfred Tarski's characterization of the informal concept of logical consequence. This study evaluates and expands upon ideas set forth in Tarski's 1936 article on logical consequence, and appeals to his 1935 article on truth. Classical logic, as well as extensions and deviations are considered. Issues in the philosophy of logic such as the nature of logical constants, the philosophical significance of completeness, and the metaphysical and epistemological implications of logic are discussed in the context of the examination of the concept of logical consequence.
The Metaphysics of Logical Consequence
Author: Alexandra Zinke
language: en
Publisher: Verlag Vittorio Klostermann
Release Date: 2018
The book discusses the central notion of logic: the concept of logical consequence. It shows that the classical definition of consequence as truth preservation in all models must be restricted to all admissible models. The challenge for the philosophy of logic is therefore to supplement the definition with a criterion for admissible models. The problem of logical constants, so prominent in the current debate, constitutes but a special case of this much more general demarcation problem. The book explores the various dimensions of the problem of admissible models and argues that standard responses are unwarranted. As a result, it develops a new vision of logic, suggesting in particular that logic is deeply imbued with metaphysics.