The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
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Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Author: National Academy of Sciences
language: en
Publisher: National Academies Press
Release Date: 2002-08-01
Drawing upon the considerable existing body of technical material related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the National Academy of Sciences reviewed and assessed the key technical issues that arose during the Senate debate over treaty ratification. In particular, these include: (1) the capacity of the United States to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing; (2) the nuclear-test detection capabilities of the international monitoring system (with and without augmentation by national systems and instrumentation in use for scientific purposes, and taking into account the possibilities for decoupling nuclear explosions from surrounding geologic media); and (3) the additions to their nuclear-weapons capabilities that other countries could achieve through nuclear testing at yield levels that might escape detection, and the effect of such additions on the security of the United States.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Negotiations
Author: Maurice A. Mallin
language: en
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Release Date: 2017
On July 16, 1945, the United States conducted the world's first nuclear explosive test in Alamagordo, New Mexico. The test went off as planned; a nuclear chain reaction, in the form of an explosion, could be created. Less than a month later, nuclear weapons were used to support Allied efforts to end World War II. Just 4 years later, on August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test. The United States intensified efforts to develop the hydrogen bomb, which it tested in 1952. The development of new nuclear weapon designs, as well as the imperative to test these designs, were now inextricably linked. Nuclear tests were considered essential to maintaining confidence in the effectiveness and usability of these weapons. Since the Alamogordo test, upwards of 2,000 nuclear tests have taken place globally. Of these, 528 were conducted in the atmosphere, with significant environmental consequences. Between 1945 and 1950, seven atmospheric nuclear tests took place. As the Cold War escalated, weapons testing accelerated: 63 such tests occurred between 1951 and 1954. Three of these were conducted by the United Kingdom, who joined the nuclear "club" with a test in 1952 (France tested in 1960, followed by China in 1964). In 1954, after an unexpectedly powerful and environmentally damaging test called Castle Bravo took place over Bikini Atoll in the Asia Pacific, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called for a "standstill" in nuclear explosive testing: "Pending progress towards some solution, full or partial, in respect of the prohibition of these weapons of mass destruction, the Government would consider, some sort of what may be called a "standstill agreement" in respect, at least, of these actual explosions." In 1958 the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom undertook negotiations over a cessation of nuclear testing, but a number of issues, mostly related to verifying compliance, proved intractable. Some success was attained after the Cuban Missile Crisis, as the three parties agreed in 1963 to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which banned all nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space, or underwater. Nuclear tests would henceforth be permitted only underground. Subsequent efforts to negotiate a complete cessation proved unsuccessful until 1994, when negotiations on a multilateral comprehensive nuclear test ban began in earnest. These negotiations were completed in 1996. Shortly thereafter, a treaty text was overwhelmingly supported at the United Nations. However, over 20 years later, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not yet entered into force. As such, this case study will consider the following: -- the developments that led to the start of negotiations; - the perspectives of the key actors and their impacts upon the negotiations; - summary of the negotiations, focusing on key issues and the efforts to reach resolution on them; - the endgame of the negotiationsa few key lessons learned, which may have utility for future multilateral negotiations, touching on issues associated with leadership, factors that impact decisionmaking, and how a negotiation must balance national interests and negotiating objectives.
Detect and Deter: Can Countries Verify the Nuclear Test Ban?
Author: Ola Dahlman
language: en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date: 2011-09-03
How can countries verify compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and detect and deter violations? It is in their interest to increase their verification readiness because the assessment of compliance with the treaty rests with states parties to the CTBT. The treaty provides countries with two verification elements: an international system of monitoring stations, and an on-site inspection regime. The monitoring system can detect nuclear explosions underground, in the atmosphere and under water. This book provides incentives to nations around the world on how they can organize their efforts to verify compliance with the CTBT and how they can collaborate with other countries, perhaps on a regional basis, to monitor areas of concern. Such focused efforts can improve their detection and deterrence capabilities through precision monitoring. The book addresses the CTBT verification from the perspective of countries. It shows how they can create the essential tools for the assessment of the large amounts of data available from the verification regime and other sources, including observations from satellites and thousands of stations outside of the treaty regime. Countries can also use current scientific and technological developments to assist them in verifying compliance with the treaty. The book offers political and scientific analysis on the evolution of the treaty over the years. The book is intended for professionals in the political, diplomatic, scientific and military fields who deal with international security, non-proliferation and arms control. It is also intended for non-governmental organizations and journalists seeking a better understanding of the nuclear test ban issue and how states can verify compliance with the treaty.