The Cognitive Foundations Of Group Attitudes And Social Interaction
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The Cognitive Foundations of Group Attitudes and Social Interaction
This book offers a widely interdisciplinary approach to investigating important questions surrounding the cognitive foundations of group attitudes and social interaction. The volume tackles issues such as the relationship between individual and group attitudes, the cognitive bases of group identity and group identification and the link between emotions and individual attitudes. This volume delves into the links between individual attitudes (such as beliefs, goals and intentions) and how they are reflected in shared attitudes where common belief, collective acceptance, joint intentions, and group preferences come into play. It pursues answers to the connections between trust and beliefs, goals and intentions and attempts to investigate questions such as: does trust have an affective component and how it may relate to hope and fear? The volume also scrutinizes game theory and questions whether it can satisfactorily explain and model social interaction and if there may be any concepts which are not addressed by the current theory. Contributors are derived from disciplines including philosophy, economics, psychology, logic and computer science. Interdisciplinary in scope and comprehensive detail, this volume integrates a variety of approaches – philosophical, psychological and artificial intelligence – to strategic, normative and emotional aspects of social interaction.
Dimensions of Shared Agency: A Study on Joint, Collective and Group Intentional Action
"Dimensions of Shared Agency" investigates the way in which standard philosophical accounts have been dealing with the issue of collective actions. In particular, the book focuses on the ‘Big Five’ of analytical social ontology (namely, Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, Philip Pettit, John R. Searle and Raimo Tuomela) and their accounts of shared/collective intentions and actions. Through systematic readings of different positions in the debate, the author proposes original ways of analyzing and classifying current theories of shared agency according to whether they advance a member-level or a group-level account of shared agency. While member-level accounts (MLA) are theories of shared agency based on individuals’ attitudes and actions, group-level accounts (GLA) give attention to the group of individuals considered as a whole, i.e., as an agent itself. Criticism arises against the idea that the Big Five have proposed stable group-level accounts suitable for explaining the case of shared agency as a group-level phenomenon. The widespread tendency in the debate is to endorse a perspective called holistic individualism, which maintains that high-level explanations are objective even though social facts are ontologically reducible to facts about individuals. Lasagni argues that as long as holistic individualism is held, the GLA is reducible to the MLA because holistic individualism upholds ontological individualism based on a deep individualistic premise, fixing the special status of individual agents as natural persons. The premise makes the claim to treat groups as agents contradictory to the general framework of the theory. This book profiles an alternative interpretation according to which agency should be considered as a functional kind, which is equally instantiated by different systems, such as individual human beings and organized social groups. In this way, the author claims, the reduction of the social can be avoided. "Dimensions of Shared Agency" will be of interest to doctoral students, researchers, and scholars interested in social ontology and the philosophy of the social sciences. It can also be utilised as supplementary reading or an introduction to philosophy students and scholars who are first approaching the philosophy of collective intentionality and shared agency.
Model-Based Reasoning, Abductive Cognition, Creativity
This book discusses how scientific and other types of cognition make use of models, abduction, and explanatory reasoning in order to produce important, innovative, and possibly creative changes in theories and concepts. Gathering revised contributions presented at the international conference on Model-Based Reasoning (MBR023), held on June 7–9, 2023 in Rome, Italy, the book addresses various intertwined topics ranging from the epistemology and applications of models also concerning the problem of knowledge production and scientific methodology (information visualization, experimental methods, and design) to the analysis of their role in cognition, decision-making, also with respect to social implications. The problem of model-based cognition is also illustrated taking advantage of recent results regarding problem-solving, abduction, and logic, paying attention to a critique of the dominant and received approaches, to the aim of fostering new discussions and stimulate new ideas. All in all, the book provides researchers and graduate students in the fields of applied philosophy, epistemology, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence alike with an authoritative snapshot of the latest theories and applications of model-based reasoning.