Set Theory With A Universal Set

Set Theory with a Universal Set

Set theory is concerned with the foundation of mathematics. In the original formulations of set theory, there were paradoxes contained in the idea of the "set of all sets". Current standard theory (Zermelo-Fraenkel) avoids these paradoxes by restricting the way sets may be formed by othersets, specifically to disallow the possibility of forming the set of all sets. In the 1930s, Quine proposed a different form of set theory in which the set of all sets - the universal set - is allowed, but other restrictions are placed on these axioms. Since then, the steady interest expressed inthese non-standard set theories has been boosted by their relevance to computer science.The second edition still concentrates largely on Quine's New Foundations, reflecting the author's belief that this provides the richest and most mysterious of the various systems dealing with set theories with a universal set. Also included is an expanded and completely revised account of the settheories of Church-Oswald and Mitchell, with descriptions of permutation models and extensions that preserve power sets. Dr Foster here presents the reader with a useful and readable introduction for those interested in this topic, and a reference work for those already involved in this area.

Elementary Set Theory with a Universal Set

Universality in Set Theories

The book discusses the fate of universality and a universal set in several set theories. The book aims at a philosophical study of ontological and conceptual questions around set theory. Set theories are ontologies. They posit sets and claim that these exhibit the essential properties laid down in the set theoretical axioms. Collecting these postulated entities quantified over poses the problem of universality. Is the collection of the set theoretical entities itself a set theoretical entity? What does it mean if it is, and what does it mean if it is not? To answer these questions involves developing a theory of the universal set. We have to ask: Are there different aspects to universality in set theory, which stand in conflict to each other? May inconsistency be the price to pay to circumvent ineffability? And most importantly: How far can axiomatic ontology take us out of the problems around universality?