Rationality Rules And Structure
Download Rationality Rules And Structure PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Rationality Rules And Structure book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages.
Rationality, Rules, and Structure
Author: Julian Nida-Rümelin
language: en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date: 2013-04-17
It is an obvious fact that human agency is constrained and structured by many kinds of rules: rules that are constitutive for communication, morality, persons, and society, and juridical rules. So the question is: what roles are played by social rules and the structural traits of human agency in rational decision making? What bearing does this have on the theory of practical rationality? These issues can only be discussed within an interdisciplinary setting, with researchers drawn from philosophy, decision theory and the economic and social sciences. The problem is of profound, fundamental concern to the social scientist and has attracted a great deal of intellectual effort. Contributors include distinguished researchers in their respective fields and the book thus presents state-of-the-art theory. It can also be used as a textbook in advanced philosophy, economics and social science classes.
Power, Rule and Domination (RLE: Organizations)
This volume presents a critical analysis of sociological theorizing and power which enables the reader to grasp fully the nature of power, rule and domination in organizational life. By making use of the discussions he recorded at a construction site, the author brings the reader into contact with the everyday social world in which he locates his analysis of power and authority at both a structural and phenomenological level. This analysis is complemented by the author’s review of the literature on ‘theorizing’ by writers such as Wittgenstein, Blum, McHugh, Phillips and Cicourel; his examination of the ‘community power debate’ between authors such as Bachrach and Baratz and Dahl; and a survey of the literature on power in its organizational aspects by Weber, Simmel and the more contemporary work of Hickson.
Rational Rules
Author: Shaun Nichols
language: en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date: 2021-02-11
Moral systems, like normative systems more broadly, involve complex mental representations. Rational Rules proposes that moral learning can be understood in terms of general-purpose rational learning procedures. Nichols argues that statistical learning can help answer a wide range of questions about moral thought: Why do people think that rules apply to actions rather than consequences? Why do people expect new rules to be focused on actions rather than consequences? How do people come to believe a principle of liberty, according to which whatever is not expressly prohibited is permitted? How do people decide that some normative claims hold universally while others hold only relative to some group? The resulting account has both empiricist and rationalist features: since the learning procedures are domain-general, the result is an empiricist theory of a key part of moral development, and since the learning procedures are forms of rational inference, the account entails that crucial parts of our moral system enjoy rational credentials. Moral rules can also be rational in the sense that they can be effective for achieving our ends, given our ecological settings. Rational Rules argues that at least some central components of our moral systems are indeed ecologically rational: they are good at helping us attain common goals. Nichols argues that the account might be extended to capture moral motivation as a special case of a much more general phenomenon of normative motivation. On this view, a basic form of rule representation brings motivation along automatically, and so part of the explanation for why we follow moral rules is that we are built to follow rules quite generally.