Progress Challenges And Opportunities For Converting U S And Russian Research Reactors
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Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities for Converting U.S. and Russian Research Reactors
Author: Russian Academy of Sciences
language: en
Publisher: National Academies Press
Release Date: 2012-03-24
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is used for two major civilian purposes: as fuel for research reactors and as targets for medical isotope production. This material can be dangerous in the wrong hands. Stolen or diverted HEU can be used-in conjunction with some knowledge of physics-to build nuclear explosive devices. Thus, the continued civilian use of HEU is of concern particularly because this material may not be uniformly well-protected. To address these concerns, the National Research Council (NRC) of the U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) held a joint symposium on June 8-10, 2011. Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities for Converting U.S. and Russian Research Reactors summarizes the proceedings of this joint symposium. This report addresses: (1) recent progress on conversion of research reactors, with a focus on U.S.- and R.F.-origin reactors; (2) lessons learned for overcoming conversion challenges, increasing the effectiveness of research reactor use, and enabling new reactor missions; (3) future research reactor conversion plans, challenges, and opportunities; and (4) actions that could be taken by U.S. and Russian organizations to promote conversion. The agenda for the symposium is provided in Appendix A, biographical sketches of the committee members are provided in Appendix B, and the report concludes with the statement of task in Appendix C.
Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors
Author: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
language: en
Publisher: National Academies Press
Release Date: 2016-03-12
The continued presence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian installations such as research reactors poses a threat to national and international security. Minimization, and ultimately elimination, of HEU in civilian research reactors worldwide has been a goal of U.S. policy and programs since 1978. Today, 74 civilian research reactors around the world, including 8 in the United States, use or are planning to use HEU fuel. Since the last National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report on this topic in 2009, 28 reactors have been either shut down or converted from HEU to low enriched uranium fuel. Despite this progress, the large number of remaining HEU-fueled reactors demonstrates that an HEU minimization program continues to be needed on a worldwide scale. Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors assesses the status of and progress toward eliminating the worldwide use of HEU fuel in civilian research and test reactors.
Nuclear Terrorism and Global Security
This book examines the prospects and challenges of a global phase-out of highly enriched uranium—and the risks of this material otherwise being used by terrorists to make atom bombs. Terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, have demonstrated repeatedly that they seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Unbeknownst even to many security specialists, tons of bomb-grade uranium are trafficked legally each year for ostensibly peaceful purposes. If terrorists obtained even a tiny fraction of this bomb-grade uranium they could potentially construct a nuclear weapon like the one dropped on Hiroshima that killed tens of thousands. Nuclear experts and policymakers have long known of this danger but – so far – have taken only marginal steps to address it. This volume begins by highlighting the lessons of past successes where bomb-grade uranium commerce has been eliminated, such as from Argentina’s manufacture of medical isotopes. It then explores the major challenges that still lie ahead: for example, Russia’s continued use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in dozens of nuclear facilities. Each of the book’s thirteen case studies offers advice for reducing HEU in a specific sector. These insights are then amalgamated into nine concrete policy recommendations for U.S. and world leaders to promote a global phase-out of bomb-grade uranium. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, international relations and security studies.