On Condition Of Anonymity Definition
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CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Author: Martín Abadi
language: en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date: 2005-08-08
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Concurreny Theory, CONCUR 2005, held in San Francisco, CA, USA in August 2005. The 38 revised full papers presented together with 4 invited papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 100 submissions. Among the topics covered are concurrency related aspects of models of computation, Petri nets, model checking, game semantics, process algebras, real-time systems, verification techniques, secrecy and authenticity, refinement, distributed programming, constraint logic programming, typing systems and algorithms, case studies, tools, and environment for programming and verification.
One Language, Two Grammars?
Author: Günter Rohdenburg
language: en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date: 2009-01-22
This volume focuses on British-American differences in the structure of words and sentences. The first full-length treatment of the topic, it will be of interest to scholars working within the fields of English historical linguistics, language variation and change, and dialectology.
Domain Conditions and Social Rationality
This book primarily focuses on the domain conditions under which a number of important classes of binary social decision rules give rise to rational social preferences. One implication of the Arrow and Gibbard theorems is that every non-oligarchic social decision rule that satisfies the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives, a requirement crucial for the unambiguity of social choices, and the weak Pareto criterion fails to generate quasi-transitive social preferences for some configurations of individual preferences. The problem is exemplified by the famous voting paradox associated with the majority rule. Thus, in the context of rules that do not give rise to transitive (quasi-transitive) social preferences for every configuration of individual preferences, an important problem is that of formulating Inada-type necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity (quasi-transitivity). This book formulates conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity for several classes of social decision rules, including majority rules, non-minority rules, Pareto-inclusive non-minority rules, and social decision rules that are simple games. It also analyzes in detail the conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity under the method of the majority decision, and derives the maximally sufficient conditions for transitivity under the class of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules and one of its subclasses. The book also presents characterizations of some of the classes of rules for which domain conditions have been derived. The material covered is relevant to anyone interested in studying the structure of voting rules, particularly those interested in social choice theory. Providing the necessary social choice theoretic concepts, definitions, propositions and theorems, the book is essentially self-contained. The treatment throughout is rigorous, and unlike most of the literature on domain conditions, care is taken regarding the number of individuals in the 'necessity' proofs. As such it is an invaluable resource for students of economics and political science, with takeaways for everyone – from first-year postgraduates to more advanced doctoral students and scholars.