Nuclear Command Control And Communications Nc3 In Asia Pacific

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia Pacific

Currently, there are no international standards or norms that are specific to NC3 operations—the sole exception being the clause in US-Soviet/Russian nuclear arms treaties that proscribes interference with national technical means, which is an integral part of NC3. Of course, all international humanitarian laws and related treaties that apply in general to the use of nuclear weapons apply to NC3 personnel, military and civilian. Whether NC3 operations in the nine nuclear weapons states are sufficiently rigorous, robust, and secure to ensure that nuclear weapons will not be used except in extremis— defined by the International Court of Justice’s 1996 ruling on the legality of nuclear weapons was when the existence of the state itself is threatened—is doubtful. There is some evidence that at least lip service is paid to how international law shapes nuclear use options in the various elements that constitute NC3 including all instructions, orders, guidance, training, domestic laws, and the overall design of the NC3 architecture to ensure negative controls and avoid mistaken nuclear strikes. The standard for operating NC3 that is consistent with international law may be so high as impossible to achieve, in which case systematic tests against the legal criteria, similar to those conducted to ascertain the reliability with which nuclear weapons can be delivered, would rule out deployment.

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

he first overview of US NC3 since the 1980s, Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications explores the current NC3 system and its vital role in ensuring effective deterrence, contemporary challenges posed by cyber threats, new weapons technologies, and the need to modernize the United States’ Cold War–era system of systems.

Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015 and the Future Years Defense Program: U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command; Military posture; U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command; U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command; U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea; Navy Posture; Army Posture; Army active and reserve force mix; Air Force posture; Recommendations of the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force; Reform of the Defense Acquisition System