Network Centric Operations Case Study Air To Air Combat With And Without Link 16
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Network-centric Operations Case Study
Link 16 enables network-centric operations (NCO) in ways that voice-only communications cannot. How does this increase in effectiveness translate into success in battle? More than 12,000 sorties were flown in the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Operations Special Project, where Link 16 and voice-only communications were evaluated. Using NCO metrics, the authors gauged improvements provided by Link 16. The almost threefold increase in effectiveness shows the merits of the Link 16 and NCO concepts. The authors conclude that further studies should examine more complex missions and increase understanding of NCO concepts.
Network-Centric Operations Case Study: Air-to-Air Combat With and Without Link 16
In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Air Force at the request of Congress conducted the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) Operational Special Project. In this exercise, the capabilities of F-15 air superiority aircraft equipped with voice-only communications were compared with F-15s equipped with voice and JTIDS Link 16 data link communications in tactical air-to-air combat. More than 12,000 sorties were flown in this special project. Blue offensive counterair packages composed of these F-15s ranged in size from two to eight aircraft. In all cases, the packages were controlled and cued by Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. The size of the engagements ranged from two Blue fighters on two Red fighters to eight Blue fighters on 16 Red fighters. Engagements occurred during daylight and night conditions. The primary independent variable was whether the Blue F-15s were equipped with the Link 16 data link or with conventional voice communications only. The capability of the Red aircraft remained consistent during the project. On average, Blue offensive counterair packages equipped with Link 16 achieved a two-and-a-half times improvement in kill ratio (Red aircraft to Blue aircraft destroyed), both during the day and at night. However, it was unclear how and why this significant improvement in force effectiveness arose. The aim of this study is to understand whether this increase in combat effectiveness stemmed from the network-centric capabilities of F-15 aircraft equipped with Link 16 and fighter pilots able to effectively use data link communications.
Networked Forces in Stability Operations
Compares three units that conducted stability operations in the same area in northern Iraq-the 101st Airborne Division (which had only limited digital communications), the 3/2 Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), and the 1/25 SBCT (both equipped with digital networks) and finds that leadership, training, and tactics and procedures are just as important as networking capabilities for improving mission effectiveness in stability operations.