Models And Proofs Of Independence In Axiomatic Set Theory

Models and Proofs of Independence in Axiomatic Set Theory

Sets, Models and Proofs

This textbook provides a concise and self-contained introduction to mathematical logic, with a focus on the fundamental topics in first-order logic and model theory. Including examples from several areas of mathematics (algebra, linear algebra and analysis), the book illustrates the relevance and usefulness of logic in the study of these subject areas. The authors start with an exposition of set theory and the axiom of choice as used in everyday mathematics. Proceeding at a gentle pace, they go on to present some of the first important results in model theory, followed by a careful exposition of Gentzen-style natural deduction and a detailed proof of Gödel’s completeness theorem for first-order logic. The book then explores the formal axiom system of Zermelo and Fraenkel before concluding with an extensive list of suggestions for further study. The present volume is primarily aimed at mathematics students who are already familiar with basic analysis, algebra and linear algebra. It contains numerous exercises of varying difficulty and can be used for self-study, though it is ideally suited as a text for a one-semester university course in the second or third year.

Philosophy of Mathematics

Do numbers, sets, and so forth, exist? What do mathematical statements mean? Are they literally true or false, or do they lack truth values altogether? Addressing questions that have attracted lively debate in recent years, Stewart Shapiro contends that standard realist and antirealist accounts of mathematics are both problematic. As Benacerraf first noted, we are confronted with the following powerful dilemma. The desired continuity between mathematical and, say, scientific language suggests realism, but realism in this context suggests seemingly intractable epistemic problems. As a way out of this dilemma, Shapiro articulates a structuralist approach. On this view, the subject matter of arithmetic, for example, is not a fixed domain of numbers independent of each other, but rather is the natural number structure, the pattern common to any system of objects that has an initial object and successor relation satisfying the induction principle. Using this framework, realism in mathematics can be preserved without troublesome epistemic consequences. Shapiro concludes by showing how a structuralist approach can be applied to wider philosophical questions such as the nature of an "object" and the Quinean nature of ontological commitment. Clear, compelling, and tautly argued, Shapiro's work, noteworthy both in its attempt to develop a full-length structuralist approach to mathematics and to trace its emergence in the history of mathematics, will be of deep interest to both philosophers and mathematicians.