Mind Language And Intentionality
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Mind, Language and Intentionality
This book proposes to examine John Searle's philosophy of mind namely the biological naturalism. Firstly the mind is evolved like any other biological phenomena in the world. Hence, the mind is part of the nature. Secondly, the mind is irreducible to the physical functions of the body. Therefore, the mind is independent of the nature. This poses ambivalence in reader's mind. Some of Searle's critics like Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Ruth Milhkan, J. N. Mohanty, Brain Loar, Cpllin McGinn and many others are discussed in order to study the contemporary debates in philosophy of mind and have a comprehensive understanding of Searle's philosophy of mind. The discussion in this book is centered around the above cites points and analysis has been developed reflection on three important concepts namely mind, language and intentionality. They are intrinsic to human life. Their intrinsicness is shown in their construal of experience, meaning and action. The deepness of human conscious life is not measurable rather can be experienced within the realm of human form of life. Thus the present essay is a critique of Searle's the orization of the mind.
Intentionality Deconstructed
Author: Amir Horowitz
language: en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date: 2024-04-01
Intentionality Deconstructed argues for the view that no concrete entity - mental, linguistic, or any other - can possess intentional content. Nothing can be about anything. The concept of intentionality is flawed, and so content ascriptions cannot be "absolutely" true or false - they lack truth conditions. Nonetheless, content ascriptions have truth conditions and can be true (or possess a related epistemic merit) relative to practices of content ascription, so that different practices may imply different (not real but practice-dependent) intentional objects for the same token mental state. The suggested view does not deny the existence of those mental states standardly considered intentional, notably the so-called propositional attitudes; it affirms it. That is, support is provided for the existence of those states with the properties usually attributed to them, but absent intentional properties. Specifically, it is argued that the so-called propositional attitudes possess logico-syntactic properties, whose postulation plays an important role in addressing the challenge of reconciling intentional anti-realism with beliefs being true or having alternative epistemic merits, the argument from the predictive and explanatory success of content ascription for intentional realism, and the cognitive suicide objection to views that deny intentionality. As part of the rejection of this final objection, intentional anti-realism is presented as a radical view, which claims "Nothing can possess intentional content" but not that nothing can possess intentional content, and it is argued that this is a legitimate characteristic of radical philosophy. In spite of rejecting the "claim that" talk, intentional anti-realism gives clear sense to its dispute with its rivals as well as to its own superiority. Various arguments for intentional anti-realism are presented. One argument rejects all possible accounts of intentionality, namely primitivism, intrinsic reductionism - the prominent example of which is the phenomenal intentionality thesis - and extrinsic reductionism (that is, reductive naturalistic accounts). According to another argument, since intentional properties are shown to be dispensable for all possibly relevant purposes, and no sound arguments support the claim that they ever are instantiated, the application of Ockham's razor shows that no such properties ever are instantiated, and another step shows that neither can they be.
Languages of Intentionality
Author: Paul S. MacDonald
language: en
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
Release Date: 2012-06-28
Intentionality - the relationship between conscious states and their objects - is one of the most discussed topics in contemporary debates in philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience and the study of consciousness. Long a foundational concept in Phenomenology, it has also received considerable coverage in the writings of analytic philosophers. This book is the first study to offer an impartial, well-informed assessment of the two traditions' approaches through an in-depth investigation of the principal thinkers' ideas, so that their positions emerge side-by-side, converging and diverging on certain shared themes. Beginning with a historical discussion of thedevelopment of the term in the work of Continental thinkers in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the book considers the work of Brentano and Husserl and subsequent existentialist critiques. From there, it explores how empirical-analytic philosophers took up the topic, drawn as they were to materialist and computer models of the mind. Finally MacDonald presents a new 'hybrid' account of intentionality that will be a crucial work for scholars working on consciousness and the mind.