Managing Change In The Defence Workforce
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Managing the Defence Inventory
Author: Great Britain. National Audit Office
language: en
Publisher: The Stationery Office
Release Date: 2012
The Ministry of Defence is buying more inventory than it uses and not consistently disposing of stock it no longer needs. Between the end of March 2009 and the end of December 2011 the total value of the inventory held by the armed forces and in central depots of non-explosives increased by 13 per cent, from £17.2 billion to £19.5 billion. The Department estimates that for raw material and consumable inventory, such as clothing or ammunition, it has spent £4 billion between April 2009 and March 2011, but did not use £1.5 billion (38 per cent) worth. The NAO estimates that the costs of storing and managing inventory were at least £277 million in 2010-11. Furthermore, over £4.2 billion of non-explosive inventory has not moved at all for at least two years and a further £2.4 billion of non-explosive inventory already held is sufficient to last for five years or more. During 2010 and 2011, the MOD identified inventory worth a total of £1.4 billion that could either be sold or destroyed, but it was unable to information on the value of the stock that had been destroyed. MOD has already introduced improvements but strategies and performance reporting do not yet focus on effective inventory management. There are also few targets for monitoring the efficiency of inventory management. The Department has commissioned a review to establish and sustain more cost effective inventory management and plans to implement its recommendations by March 2013
Lessons from Cancelling the InterCity West Coast Franchise Competition
Author: Great Britain: National Audit Office
language: en
Publisher: The Stationery Office
Release Date: 2012-12-07
The Department for Transport competition to let the Intercity West Coast franchise lacked management oversight and the governance of the project was confused, according to the National Audit Office. The full cost to the taxpayer is unknown but likely to be significant, with at least £1.9 million in staff and adviser costs, £2.7 million in legal costs and £4.3 million on external advisers for the reviews that it has commissioned. The refranchising process was a major endeavour, with considerable complexity and uncertainty. The objectives of the Department for Transport were insufficiently clear during the franchise competition. The Department delayed the issuing of the invitation to tender by eight months because it had not finalized how it would implement recent policy changes. There was also confusion among Department staff about some aspects of the process. The subordinated loan facility was a particular area of confusion. A subordinated loan is capital provided by the parent company which guarantees franchise payments will be made to the Department should the franchisee get less passenger revenue than expected. However, there were significant errors in the tool the Department used to calculate how big a loan it would require bidders to have. The competition lacked strong project management and there was no clear route for the project team to get approval for major issues. No one person oversaw the whole process or could see patterns of emerging problems.
Making British Defence Policy
This book explores the process by which defence policy is made in contemporary Britain and the institutions, actors and conflicting interests which interact in its inception and continuous reformulation. Rather than dealing with the substance of defence policy, this study focuses upon the institutional actors involved in this process. This is a subject which has commanded far more interest from public, Parliament, government and the armed forces since the protracted, bloody and ultimately unsuccessful British military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The work begins with a discussion of two contextual factors shaping policy. The first relates to the impact of Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States over defence and intelligence matters, while the second considers the impact of Britain’s relatively disappointing economic performance upon the funding of British defence since 1945. It then goes on to explore the role and impact of all the key policy actors, from the Prime Minister, Cabinet and core executive, to the Ministry of Defence and its relations with the broader ‘Whitehall village’, and the Foreign Office and Treasury in particular. The work concludes by examining the increasing influence of external policy actors and forces, such as Parliament, the courts, political parties, pressure groups and public opinion. This book will be of much interest to students of British defence policy, security studies, and contemporary military history.