Logical Pluralism And Logical Consequence
Download Logical Pluralism And Logical Consequence PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Logical Pluralism And Logical Consequence book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages.
Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence
Author: Erik Stei
language: en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date: 2023-03-30
A detailed discussion and rejection of the view that there is more than one correct logic.
Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence
Author: Erik Stei
language: en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date: 2023-03-30
Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. This is not necessarily a controversial claim but in its most exciting formulations, pluralism extends to logics that have typically been considered rival accounts of logical consequence – to logics, that is, which adopt seemingly contradictory views about basic logical laws or arguments. The logical pluralist challenges the philosophical orthodoxy that an argument is either deductively valid or invalid by claiming that there is more than one way for an argument to be valid. In this book, Erik Stei defends logical monism, provides a detailed analysis of different possible formulations of logical pluralism, and offers an original account of the plurality of correct logics that incorporates the benefits of both pluralist and monist approaches to logical consequence. His book will be valuable for a range of readers in the philosophy of logic.
Logical Pluralism
Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them. In particular, they argue that broadly classical, intuitionistic, and relevant accounts of deductive logic are genuine logical consequence relations; we should not search for one true logic, since there are many. Their conclusions have profound implications for many linguists as well as for philosophers.