Insight Turkey Winter 2021 New Geopolitics In The Eastern Mediterranean
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Insight Turkey / Winter 2021 - New Geopolitics in The Eastern Mediterranean
After being the focal point of the regional and global power competition for centuries, the Eastern Mediterranean region has recently re-emerged as a point of convergence in international politics. Over the last two decades, especially, many regional and global powers have begun to develop strategies toward the Eastern Mediterranean leading to a fierce rivalry amongst them. There are several reasons for the increase in the political, strategic, and economic importance of the region. However, four are especially noteworthy, and while two are long-standing factors, there are two significant novel developments that have contributed to the re-emergence of the strategic importance of the region. First, the main deep-seated reason stems from its geostrategic and geopolitical importance. The Eastern Mediterranean hosts some of the most strategic seaways in the world, such as the Suez Canal and the Turkish Straits. While the Suez Canal has served as the main sea passage bridging the East to the West since its opening in 1869, the Turkish Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles) has for centuries connected the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea and so the Atlantic Ocean. Second, due to its strategic importance the Eastern Mediterranean region has always been one of the most penetrated regions in the world. Many global and regional powers such as the U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Turkey, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt and Saudi Arabia continue to intervene into regional affairs resulting in power struggles. While the U.S. is trying to maintain its superiority in the region following the Cold War period, Russia aims to reach the warm seas, its long-time strategic objective. On the other hand, the UK, France, and Turkey are working to protect their historical and imperial links with the region. Starting with President Obama, the U.S. has followed a retrenchment policy which has resulted in power vacuums in different regions including the Eastern Mediterranean. Under these circumstances the Western-dominated regional system and political stability has changed dramatically, and the power vacuum created after the U.S. downsized its regional role is filled by many other challenger states. One of these states is Russia which seems to have settled itself into the region permanently. From now on, it will be quite difficult to extricate Russia from the region and without doubt it will continue to pose a threat from the south to European countries. China is another actor that has gained a foothold in the region lately by improving its relations with some regional countries and by investing in the control of significant seaports. Furthermore, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have also started trying to influence the regional balance of power. Consequently, all the cards are reshuffled in the Eastern Mediterranean and a new great game is underway in the region. Third, as the most significant novel development, the exploration of natural gas in the region has contributed to its geostrategic importance. Considered as one of the richest deposits with approximately 4.5 percent of the total natural gas reserves in the world, the Eastern Mediterranean has become of great interest to the energy market. The drilling activities performed to date show that essential portions of the reserves range from the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields, where the coasts of Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel meet, to the West Nile Delta field along the Egyptian coast. Within this framework, the regional and global powers have turned their attention to the region once again as the newly discovered rich energy resources have entered into the equation as a new parameter. Israel is the first state that discovered natural gas in Tamar (318 billion cubic meter) and Leviathan (605 billion cubic meter) fields and began to use and export it to other countries. Egypt and the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC) also discovered natural gas in the Zohr (850 billion cubic meter) field and Aphrodite (129 billion cubic meter) field, respectively. Furthermore, lately, a considerable amount of gas reserves was discovered in the Calypso and Glaucus fields located in the South of Cyprus. As new discoveries continue, other countries such as Turkey have been conducting offshore drilling activities to explore natural gas. All these activities have defrosted the longtime frozen problems of the region. The region is not rich only in terms of offshore natural gas reserves. It is known that some areas within the boundaries of Egypt and Libya are also rich in natural gas. Having the Wafa and Bouri gas fields, Libya is ranked 22nd in the world with around 1.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves. Egypt ranks as 16th in the world, with the Zohr, West Nile Delta, and Atoll fields yielding a total of around 2.2 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. It must be said that the reason many global and regional players have become involved in the Libyan civil war is closely related to its abundant energy resources. Furthermore, it is important to state that the Eastern Mediterranean is quite rich in terms of crude oil as well. Considering onshore and offshore reserves together, the region possesses nearly 3.7 percent of the world’s total oil reserves with around 64 billion barrels discovered to date. Libya alone has nearly 3.2 percent of the world’s oil reserves, with roughly 48.4 billion barrels, and Egypt has around 3.3 billion barrels of known oil reserves. Fourth, besides the three protracted crises, namely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the political crisis in Lebanon, and the Cyprus question, two more recent regional political issues, the Syrian and Libyan crises, have been attracting the attention of many regional and global powers. The external involvement of some new actors in these crises has led to a new power struggle. Turkey and Russia are the two main states that have increased their presence in the region lately by becoming the two main powers involved in the Syrian and Libyan crises. Needless to state, their military intervention in these crises has undermined the status of the traditional Western colonial powers, such as France. As a country that has the longest shores in the Eastern Mediterranean and as one of the main players in regional geopolitics, Turkey has begun to increase its military presence in the region in order to deter anti-Turkish developments. The geography has begun to occupy a critical role in Turkey’s political, security, and economic policies, and eventually has become one of the most featured parameters in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s regional policy is shaped by a number of factors. First of all, the Eastern Mediterranean has long-standing importance for Turkey, which has historical ties with almost all regional states. For centuries the region was ruled by Turkey’s predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Turkey’s involvement in regional crises such as Libya, Syria, and Palestine can be partially explained by the historical ties between Turkey and these states. Second, the Eastern Mediterranean plays a crucial role in Turkey’s security and as a result Turkey’s foreign policy towards the region is highly shaped by its security concerns. Therefore, the policies of global powers such as the U.S., the European Union, and Russia towards the region are intrinsically linked to Turkey’s security. As all these actors pursue their own national interests, it has resulted in the U.S., EU, and Russia conflicting with Turkey’s policies and expectations in the region. This has become clear on issues such as the Cyprus problem and the attempts of the Greek side to sign international agreements regarding the maritime jurisdiction zones. Both of these developments aim at eliminating Turkey’s influence over the island and the region altogether. However, Turkey has made it clear that this is not something that it will accept, and has responded by signing agreements with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Libya, in 2011 and 2019 respectively. Third, the Eastern Mediterranean is critical both for its abundant energy resources and for the bilateral economic relations between Turkey and the countries of the region; therefore, the economy is another factor determining Turkish policy towards the region. Turkey, an energy-dependent country that expects to discover new resources in its continental shelf, considers the rich hydrocarbon potential of the region as an alternative source of meeting its energy demands. Turkey seeks to both decrease its foreign dependence on energy and to increase its trade, first with neighboring countries and then with the world. In this regard, when forming its Eastern Mediterranean policy, Turkey is, on the one hand, intensely searching for natural gas and oil on its continental shelf and following policies towards transferring the resources found in other countries’ maritime zones to the Western markets through Turkey, and, on the other hand, trying to improve its relations with the countries in the region. The developments that threaten Turkey’s economic and security interests have urged Ankara to a closer involvement with the region. Tensions have risen with Greece’s eagerness to give its islands maritime jurisdiction zones beyond their territorial waters, which will cut into Turkey’s continental shelf and the GASC’s licensing of maritime blocks to international companies for energy research activities. Violating the TRNC and Turkey’s rights, and, with the aim of making their illegal actions permanent, their signing of agreements in close cooperation with Israel, Egypt, and the U.S., as well as conducting joint military operations will not contribute to the resolution of the problems. Within this framework, this issue of Insight Turkey highlights different affairs regarding the Eastern Mediterranean region. A number of leading and well-known intellectuals and academicians have contributed to this issue focusing on political, legal, and energy dimensions of maritime tensions and the rise of a new geopolitics in the region. This issue includes pieces that look at the Eastern Mediterranean tensions through the lens of international law. Ayfer Erdoğan’s research article examines the legal and political dimensions of the disputes by analyzing the standpoints of the main actor’s in the region. Meanwhile, the commentary written by Sertaç Hami Başeren reviews their justifications with reference to international law, with particular reference to Turkey’s actions. Furthermore, based on the principle that maritime delimitation should be carried out to reach an equitable solution by taking all the relevant circumstances into account, Yücel Acer argues that Turkey has developed a comprehensive legal approach as to the maritime delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean and even submitted a map to the UN to demonstrate Turkey’s claimed continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) areas. While keeping up with the recent developments in the United States, Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney and Vişne Korkmaz’s research article examines how and why Washington has come to embrace the logic of ‘Alliance Axis’ to shape the Eastern Mediterranean and explores the projected impact of the U.S.-initiated Abraham Accords on regional geopolitics. Meanwhile, Muhammad Soliman Alzawawy’s commentary aims to forecast the route and different scenarios that the new American President Joe Biden will take in his foreign policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean region through investigating the content of his speeches and rhetoric before and shortly after taking office. Galip Emre Yıldırım highlights the stance of another actor in the region by arguing that France’s identification of Turkey as an ‘external enemy’ reflects the former’s political and economic concerns with regard to the Mediterranean gas reserves. Sohbet Karbuz gives an overview of the key commercial, technical, legal, and political challenges the East Mediterranean gas faces, with a critical eye and proposes possible ways to overcome them. Karbuz discusses the challenges facing the monetization of the discoveries by looking at both the commercial challenges hampering the exploration and field development activities and the technical challenges for exporting gas to the immediate and distant markets. In addition to these eight pieces focusing on the Eastern Mediterranean, there are some insightful manuscripts on a range of topics regarding the recent developments in the international political arena. With regard to the recent changes at the level of the white house, Inderjeet Parmar analyses President Donald Trump’s attempted coup. Parmar also questions the political will of the new President to extirpate Trumpism and white supremacy from the U.S. body politic. After three-and-a-half-years into the crisis that struck the heart of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Marwan Kabalan sheds light on how the 41st Gulf Summit in the Saudi city of al-Ula, brought the blockade of Qatar to an end. From our off-topic research articles, Nikolay Kozhanov tries to prove the importance of the economic factors for the current development of Russia’s relations with the Gulf States. He also assesses the prospects for continued economic cooperation between the GCC states and Moscow. Ramazan Erdağ’s article concludes this issue with a discussion on why Russia replaced the South Stream project with the TurkStream by changing its route and name, and why Turkey is involved in a project on the North-South line although it plays a vital role in the Trans-Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline Project in the southern gas corridor. While the importance of the region certainly is going to increase in the following years as more regional and global actors will be included in the power struggle, it is necessary to analyze and understand the issue from geopolitical, economic and legal standpoints. With that said, we are confident that this issue of Insight Turkey entitled “New Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean” will provide timely studies regarding the Turkish perspective on a complex and increasingly important issue in the global power struggle.
21st-Century Statecraft
From civilisational frontier risks associated with new challenges like disruptive technologies, to the shifting nature of great-power conflicts and subversion, the 21st century requires a new approach to statecraft. In 21st-Century Statecraft, Professor Nayef Al-Rodhan proposes five innovative statecraft concepts. He makes the case for a new method of geopolitical analysis called 'meta-geopolitics', and for 'dignity-based governance'. He shows how, in an interdependent and interconnected world, traditional thinking must move beyond zero-sum games and focus on 'multi-sum and symbiotic realist' interstate relations. This requires a new paradigm of global security premised on five dimensions of security, and a new concept of power, 'just power', which highlights the centrality of justice to state interests. These concepts enable states to balance competing interests and work towards what the author calls 'reconciliation statecraft'. Throughout, Professor Al-Rodhan brings his philosophical and neuroscientific expertise to bear, providing a practical model for conducting statecraft in a sustainable way.
Insight Turkey - Winter 2023 / Volume 25, Number 1 - Türkiye at the Crossroads
The regions surrounding Türkiye, i.e. Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, Black Sea, and South Caucasus, continue to experience war, political instability, economic crises, and humanitarian problems. However, if we focus specifically on the Middle East, we can see that several paradoxical developments have taken place. On the one hand, many active crises exist in the Middle East, as both the global super-power rivalry and the Arab Spring continue to influence regional affairs. Specifically, some traditional issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian question, continue to influence regional political balances. On the other hand, significant initiatives are leading to regional stability. Regional powers such as Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been trying to consolidate their regional and global effectiveness and a process of normalization between several states is underway. Many regional states, such as Iran, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, are deeply involved in domestic problems. Iran has been dealing with protests for more than two months, with hundreds of civilians and members of the security forces having lost their lives. It seems that the current wave of protests will have important implications for the future of the Iranian regime. Post-invasion Iraq is still struggling to eliminate political chaos as the near-state failure conditions continue. The two external powers, the U.S. and Iran, continue to affect Iraqi politics which further deteriorates the situation. Iran, especially, has tight control over the political administration in Iraq. As stated above, many regional countries have initiated a significant normalization process, with the Gulf states starting an intra-Gulf normalization process at the beginning of 2021. Other Gulf states have decided to normalize their relations with Qatar, even though they have held different policies towards the Arab Spring. Intra-Arab cooperation, solidarity and brotherhood were emphasized during the opening ceremony of the World Cup in Doha. The Amir of Qatar, Tamim al-Thani welcomed the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Muhammad bin Salman and Egyptian President Sisi, among others. Indeed, Amir Tamim made a friendly gesture by watching one of Saudi Arabia’s matches from the tribunes. Furthermore, other dimensions, such as Turkish-Arab, Israeli-Arab, and Iranian-Arab normalization processes, have been initiated. Türkiye has normalized its relations with many regional states, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Currently, it is trying to normalize its relations with the remaining states, most notably Egypt and Syria. In this context, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with Egyptian President Abdulfattah al-Sisi during the World Cup opening ceremony in Doha. Besides the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean and the South Caucasus regions also host influential problems. In the north, the Türkiye-Azerbaijan axis has forced regional (even global) powers to accept the current status quo, the liberation of the Nagorno-Karabakh territories of Azerbaijan. Türkiye and Azerbaijan have successfully mobilized other Turkish states to contribute to their policy perspectives. In the South, Türkiye has been trying to prevent the isolationist efforts of Greece and its supporters in the Eastern Mediterranean with the Turkish-Libyan axis emerging as a central dimension in the region. Considering the increasing political, economic, and ecological problems, the regional actors will continue to recalibrate their policies in line with future regional and global changes. Therefore, regional powers have been trying to diversify their foreign relations and thus increase their autonomy in their foreign policies. This issue of Insight Turkey covers a wide range of topics while providing an insightful analysis of regional developments, with a special focus on the Middle East. Our look at the region starts with Hakkı Uygur’s timely thoughts on the recent protests and violence in Iran. After Mahsa Amini died, Sunni groups, especially Kurds and Balochs, took the lead in the protests against the mandatory headscarf rule, resulting in more loss of life. Even though the protests in Tehran, the capital, were mostly supported by the middle- and upper-classes, they didn’t get much support from the broad masses. Instead, they turned into protests by college students, usually led by artists and athletes who were part of the elite. When the Persian media and opposition activists outside the country received a lot of attention, most reformists kept quiet. Different political groups have been using the events to work out how to share power after Khamenei. But the fact that protests have been continuing for three months, and the government hasn’t used its usual “iron fist” method to quell them, raises questions. During the same time, Iran’s relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Republic of Azerbaijan have been tense. The author argues that this is how domestic and foreign policies change and affect each other. In the same context, Mahjoob Zweiri’s research article provides an insight into defining Rouhani’s foreign policy discourse and slogans, primarily towards the GCC, while addressing significant shifts in the region that implicated Iran’s Rouhani stance towards the GCC and its members. The paper concludes by discussing how the recent Iranian elections and Ebrahim Raisi will affect the future of Iran-GCC relations. Analyses revealed that Rouhani had difficulty engaging with the GCC countries due to impediments imposed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Similarly, the article examines whether Rouhani achieved his foreign ambitions, and was able to provide a vision for the challenges that await the Raisi presidency during his era, in Iran’s foreign policy toward the GCC. Our focus on the region continues with Mohammed Muazaz al-Hadithy’s analysis of the role of the Gulf in Iraq after 2017 based on the complicated relationship between the Gulf and Iraq from 2003 to 2017. It also looks at the effects of the Gulf crisis and how the relationship between the two countries has changed. The study predicts how the relationship will change in the future based on a set of factors related to Iraqi politics, Gulf foreign policy, and the factors that affect the Gulf’s role in Iraq. Following on from this, Ghazi Alsikoty’s commentary attempts to present and analyze the chaotic nature of Iraq’s constitutional system since 2005 and its impact on political-economic and social crises. The study also tries to investigate sectarian issues and political quotas that have arisen as a result of a deep divide between the culture of reactionary parties that do not believe in the democratic modern state, the philosophy of liberal democracy, institutionalism, the separation of powers, or respect for human rights. In the following article, Yusri Hazran analyzes Israel’s strategic stance toward the Syrian crisis, drawing connections between Israel’s historical understanding of Syria and its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, current strategic considerations, and the impact of the Lebanese syndrome on Israel’s historical collective memory. Syria’s deep roots in revolutionary pan-Arabism and its consistent backing for the fight against the Jewish state have long made it a prime target for Israel’s enemies. Israel hoped that the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings would lead to the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime or at least significantly weaken it, but it has refrained from any military intervention, primarily due to what may be called the ‘Lebanese syndrome,’ or the fear of renewed entanglement and a repeat of its bitter experience in the First Lebanon War. Next, the article by Yousef M. Aljamal, Ilise Benshushan Cohen, and Philipp O. Amour looks at the early spread of COVID-19 in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the context of nationalism and sovereignty. The authors argue that the spread of COVID-19 has been difficult for Palestinians due to domestic and regional interactions and limited sovereignty, undermining their ability to combat the virus. Yet, the pandemic awoke Palestinian national sentiment, reminding them of their disunity and lack of sovereignty. Despite these obstacles, the article shows that the Palestinian health system attempted but failed to resolve the crisis and that COVID-19 has only highlighted how Palestinians cannot operate practically independently of Israel. With the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, a major question also arose regarding the feasibility of applying liberal ideas in international politics and whether national interests would take precedence over liberal values in the international system. In our final commentary, the focus shifts to the EU area, with Saddam A. H. Obaid and Aishah Hanifa providing a topical commentary on whether or not national interests will prevail over the liberal values of the EU during the crises. The authors contend that while liberal values thrive in times of peace, they are put to the test during times of crisis. They can sometimes fail because national interest calculations are deeply embedded in nation-states. Due to foreign, security, and energy policy considerations, the EU has also been involved in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Dilek Latif and Nusret Sinan Evcan’s timely analysis seeks to contextualize the EU’s engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean region in light of recent developments and political factors. The discovery of hydrocarbon resources in the Eastern Mediterranean shifted existing foreign policies, increased the region’s geopolitical significance, and acted as a catalyst for new geopolitical dynamics and political alignments. The hydrocarbon deposits have the potential to diversify resources and serve as a bridge for greater regional cooperation. Instead, the volatile geopolitical environment instils fear and threat perceptions. Fatma Aslı Kelkitli investigates and contrasts the foreign policy choices of three minor Central Asian governments, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, in the post-independence period in our penultimate research article. Turkmenistan’s foreign policy differs from the other three countries, despite their shared Soviet heritage, landlocked location, and population size. While Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan align with Russia, Turkmenistan maintains permanent neutrality. This paper contends that Turkmenistan’s natural resource wealth, along with fewer domestic dangers and geographical limits than Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, enabled it to conduct a more impartial and independent foreign policy. However, excessive reliance on China as the principal consumer of Turkmen natural gas may make it challenging to maintain lasting neutrality. In the concluding research article, Abdurrahman Gümüş compares Turkish foreign policy in the post-Davutoğlu era with the previous period and analyzes the changes and continuities in these two periods. In the first years of the Justice and Development Party period, Turkish foreign policy featured soft power and cooperation-based characteristics. While maintaining its proactive and multi-dimensional aspects, there were many crucial changes in Turkish foreign policy in the post-Davutoğlu era. These changes led to increasing realism, autonomous foreign policy, and the rise of deterrence and the sphere of regional influence. With one more year coming to an end, we are pleased to present to our readers yet another insightful issue of Insight Turkey that has attempted to analyze current regional and international developments comprehensively. We are looking forward to providing you with more next year!