Idealization In Epistemology A Modest Modeling Approach
Download Idealization In Epistemology A Modest Modeling Approach PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Idealization In Epistemology A Modest Modeling Approach book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages.
Idealization of Epistemology
It's standard in epistemology to approach questions about knowledge and rational belief using idealized, simplified models. But while the practice of constructing idealized models in epistemology is old, metaepistemological reflection on that practice is not. In this book I argue that the fact that epistemologists build idealized models isn't merely a metaepistemological observation that can leave first-order epistemological debates untouched. Rather, once we view epistemology through the lens of idealization and model-building, the landscape looks quite different. I defend a package of epistemological views that might otherwise have looked indefensibly dismissive of our cognitive limitations - a package according to which we know a wide variety of facts with certainty, including what our evidence is, what we know and don't know, and what follows from our knowledge. This package turns out to be much more plausible once viewed through the lens of idealization.
Idealization in Epistemology
Daniel Greco argues that the landscape of epistemology looks quite different when viewed through the lens of idealization and model-building. We should accept that theorizing in epistemological terms is inescapably idealized, and that we can know a wide variety of facts with certainty despite our cognitive limitations.
Evidentialism at 40
This volume presents state-of-the-art research on issues related to evidentialism. It demonstrates the continuing relevance of evidentialist epistemology by bringing it into direct confrontation with some of its latest non-evidentialist rivals and by proposing new areas for exploration and development. Conee and Feldman’s landmark paper “Evidentialism” (1985) served as a launching point for an enormous research program in epistemology. Many epistemologists define their points of view at least partly in terms of how they relate to evidentialism. The chapters in this volume address important questions related to evidentialism, including: How should ‘evidentialism’ be defined? When does evidence suffice for belief? What does properly or appropriately responding to one’s evidence involve? Does evidentialism capture all cases of epistemically justified believing? Is there any kind of epistemic normativity that falls outside the purview of evidentialist epistemology? Are core evidentialist theses compatible with certain forms of externalism? Do classical evidentialist theses successfully preclude pragmatism? Do moral considerations ever get a say in what it is rational to believe? What (more) should evidentialists say about suspending judgment? What is the connection between evidence and logical inference? What should evidentialists say about extended memory? Does public evidence matter to epistemic justification? The range of fresh ideas in this cutting-edge volume, marking the 40th anniversary of “Evidentialism”, will appeal to scholars and graduate students working on evidentialism, evidence, the nature of justification, evidential support, and related topics in epistemology.