Generalized Jeffrey Conditionalization
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Generalized Jeffrey Conditionalization
This book provides a frequentist semantics for conditionalization on partially known events, which is given as a straightforward generalization of classical conditional probability via so-called probability testbeds. It analyzes the resulting partial conditionalization, called frequentist partial (F.P.) conditionalization, from different angles, i.e., with respect to partitions, segmentation, independence, and chaining. It turns out that F.P. conditionalization meets and generalizes Jeffrey conditionalization, i.e., from partitions to arbitrary collections of events, opening it for reassessment and a range of potential applications. A counterpart of Jeffrey’s rule for the case of independence holds in our frequentist semantics. This result is compared to Jeffrey’s commutative chaining of independent updates. The postulate of Jeffrey's probability kinematics, which is rooted in the subjectivism of Frank P. Ramsey, is found to be a consequence in our frequentist semantics. This way the book creates a link between the Kolmogorov system of probability and one of the important Bayesian frameworks. Furthermore, it shows a preservation result for conditional probabilities under the full update range and compares F.P. semantics with an operational semantics of classical conditional probability in terms of so-called conditional events. Lastly, it looks at the subjectivist notion of desirabilities and proposes a more fine-grained analysis of desirabilities a posteriori. This book appeals to researchers who are involved in any kind of knowledge processing systems. F.P. conditionalization is a straightforward, fundamental concept that fits human intuition, and is systematically linked to one of the important Bayesian frameworks. As such, the book is interesting for anybody investigating the semantics of reasoning systems.
Causation, Coherence and Concepts
Author: W. Spohn
language: en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date: 2008-11-14
In this collection I present 16 of my, I feel, more substantial papers on theoretical philosophy, 12 as originally published, one co-authored with Ulrike Haas-Spohn (Chapter14), one (Chapter 15) that was a brief conference commentary, but is in fact a suitable appendix to Chapter 14, one as a translation of a German paper (Chapter 12), and one newly written for this volume (Chapter 16), which, however, is only my recent attempt to properly and completely express an argument I had given in two earlier papers. I gratefully acknowledge permission of reprint from the relevant publishers at the beginning of each paper. In disciplinary terms the papers cover epistemology, general philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The section titles Belief, Causation, Laws, Coherence, and Concepts and the paper titles give a more adequate impression of the topics dealt with. The papers are tightly connected. I feel they might be even read as unfolding a program, though this program was never fully clear in my mind and still isn’t. In the Introduction I attempt to describe what this program might be, thus drawing a reconstructed red thread, or rather two red threads, through all the papers. This will serve, at the same time, as an overview over the papers collected.
Reasons Without Persons
Author: Brian Hedden
language: en
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Release Date: 2015
Brian Hedden defends a radical view about rationality, personal identity, and time. He argues that what it is rational to do should not depend on your past beliefs or actions, which are not part of your current perspective on the world. His impersonal approach holds that what rationality demands of you is solely determined by your evidence.