Free Will And Action Explanation
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Free Will and Action Explanation
Author: Scott Robert Sehon
language: en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date: 2016
Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon addresses these key questions by focusing on an underlying issue: the nature of action explanation. He proposes a non-causal account of action and agency, according to which reason explanation of human behavior is teleological rather than causal.
Free Will and Continental Philosophy
Free Will and Continental Philosophy explores the concepts of free-will and self-determination in the Continental philosophical tradition. David Rose examines the ways in which Continental philosophy offers a viable alternative to the hegemonic scientistic approach taken by analytic philosophy. Rose claims that the problem of free-will is only a problem if one makes an unnecessary assumption consistent with scientific rationalism. In the sphere of human action we assume that, since action is a physical event, it must be reducible to the laws and concepts of science. Hence, the problematic nature of free will raises its head, since the concept of free will is intrinsically contradictory to such a reductionist outlook. This book suggests that the Continental thinkers offer a compelling alternative by concentrating on the phenomena of human action and self-determination in order to offer the truth of freedom in different terms. Thus Rose offers a revealing investigation into the appropriate concepts and categories of human freedom and action.
The Bounds of Freedom: Kant’s Causal Theory of Action
Author: Robert Greenberg
language: en
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG
Release Date: 2016-09-26
This monograph is a new interpretation of Kant’s àtemporal conception of the causality of the freedom of the will. The interpretation is based on an analysis of Kant’s primary conception of an action, viz., as a causal consequence of the will. The analysis in turn is based on H. P. Grice’s causal theory of perception and on P. F. Strawson’s modification of the theory. The monograph rejects the customary assumption that Kant’s maxim of an action is a causal determination of the action. It assumes instead that the maxim is definitive of the action, and since its main thesis is that an action for Kant is to be primarily understood as an effect of the will, it concludes that the maxim of an action can only be its logical determination. Kant’s àtemporal conception of the causality of free will is confronted not only by contemporary philosophical conceptions of causality, but by Kant’s own complementary theory of causality, in the Second Analogy of Experience. According to this latter conception, causality is a natural relation among physical and psychological objects, and is therefore a temporal relation among them. Faced with this conflict, Kant scholars like Allen W. Wood either reject Kant’s àtemporal conception of causality or like Henry E. Allison accept it, but only in an anodyne form. Both camps, however, make the aforementioned assumption that Kant’s maxim of an action is a causal determination of the action. The monograph, rejecting the assumption, belongs to neither camp.