Financial Aggregation And Index Number Theory
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Financial Aggregation and Index Number Theory
The book surveys modern literature on financial aggregation and index number theory, with special emphasis on the contributions of the book's two coauthors. In addition to an introduction and a systematic survey chapter unifying the rest of the book, this publication contains reprints of six published articles central to the survey chapter. Financial Aggregation and Index Number Theory provides a reference work for financial data researchers and users of central bank data, placing emphasis on possible improvements in such data from use of the microeconomic index number and aggregation theory.
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
The award-winning The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition is now available as a dynamic online resource. Consisting of over 1,900 articles written by leading figures in the field including Nobel prize winners, this is the definitive scholarly reference work for a new generation of economists. Regularly updated! This product is a subscription based product.
Getting it Wrong
A leading economist contends that the recent financial crisis was caused not by the failure of mainstream economics but by corrupted monetary data constructed without reference to economics. Blame for the recent financial crisis and subsequent recession has commonly been assigned to everyone from Wall Street firms to individual homeowners. It has been widely argued that the crisis and recession were caused by “greed” and the failure of mainstream economics. In Getting It Wrong, leading economist William Barnett argues instead that there was too little use of the relevant economics, especially from the literature on economic measurement. Barnett contends that as financial instruments became more complex, the simple-sum monetary aggregation formulas used by central banks, including the U.S. Federal Reserve, became obsolete. Instead, a major increase in public availability of best-practice data was needed. Households, firms, and governments, lacking the requisite information, incorrectly assessed systemic risk and significantly increased their leverage and risk-taking activities. Better financial data, Barnett argues, could have signaled the misperceptions and prevented the erroneous systemic-risk assessments. When extensive, best-practice information is not available from the central bank, increased regulation can constrain the adverse consequences of ill-informed decisions. Instead, there was deregulation. The result, Barnett argues, was a worst-case toxic mix: increasing complexity of financial instruments, inadequate and poor-quality data, and declining regulation. Following his accessible narrative of the deep causes of the crisis and the long history of private and public errors, Barnett provides technical appendixes, containing the mathematical analysis supporting his arguments.