Exploring A Theory Of Morality And Religion Moderate Constructivism

Exploring a Theory of Morality and Religion: Moderate Constructivism

This book is a fundamental contribution to well-known debates about intuitionism in ethics in light of older traditions. Debates about moral intuitionism do not take into account the theoretical resources of moderate voluntarism. The author submits that these debates should focus attention on ‘intellectualism versus voluntarism’ instead of ‘intuitionism versus utilitarianism’. Whereas according to moral intellectualism moral duty is seen by intuition or detected otherwise, according to moderate voluntarism moral duty is created or generated by moral commitment, ‘commitment’ being used in a broad, technical sense. The author argues for moderate voluntarism. According to moderate voluntarism moral duty can be explained by bringing out moral commitments which are correctly articulated by principles of moral duty at issue. A question about moral duty is, whether pertinent moral commitments are reasonable and acceptable. Absolute moral duty too is generated or constructed rather than detected. Moderate voluntarism does not deny that moral duties independent of commitment exist. The title of the first edition was: Exploring an Explanation of Moral Duty: Moderate Voluntarism. This second edition is enlarged by a new essay on moderate religious constructivism, which is similar to moderate voluntarism. Moderate constructivism does not explain religion using traditional ways of access such as revelation of a divine message. People may create a higher world by extrapolation from things around us to a higher, religious world. Moderate constructivism holds that certain statements about that higher world are relatively true, that is, true dependent on religious extrapolation.

Exploring an Explanation of Moral Duty

A Theory of Justice

In this work the author argues that the correct principles of justice are those that would be agreed to by free and rational persons, placed in the original position behind a veil of ignorance: not knowing their own place in society; their class, race, or sex; their abilities, intelligence, or strengths; or even their conception ofthe good. Accordingly, he derives two principles of justice to regulate the distribution of liberties, and of social and economic goods. In this new edition the work is presented as Rawls himself wishes it to be transmitted to posterity, with numerous minor revisions and amendments and a new Preface in which Rawls reflects on his presentation of his thesis and explains how and why he has revised it.