Explaining The Failure Of Democracy In The Democratic Republic Of Congo
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Explaining the Failure of Democracy in the Democratic Republic of Congo
Divided into two parts, this book traces the remote origins of Congo's current national predicament and the people's protracted quest for democracy and social justice. The author offers a critical analysis of post-Cold War configuration of pro-democracy forces inside the country.
The Failure of Democracy in the Republic of Congo
Why did the democratic experiment launched in the Republic of Congo in 1991 fail so dramatically in 1997? Why has it not been seriously resumed since then? This book provides an analysis of more than fifteen years of Congolese politics. It explores a series of logical hypotheses regarding why democracy failed to take root in Congo.
The Trouble with the Congo
Author: Séverine Autesserre
language: en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date: 2010-06-14
The Trouble with the Congo suggests a new explanation for international peacebuilding failures in civil wars. Drawing from more than 330 interviews and a year and a half of field research, it develops a case study of the international intervention during the Democratic Republic of the Congo's unsuccessful transition from war to peace and democracy (2003-2006). Grassroots rivalries over land, resources, and political power motivated widespread violence. However, a dominant peacebuilding culture shaped the intervention strategy in a way that precluded action on local conflicts, ultimately dooming the international efforts to end the deadliest conflict since World War II. Most international actors interpreted continued fighting as the consequence of national and regional tensions alone. UN staff and diplomats viewed intervention at the macro levels as their only legitimate responsibility. The dominant culture constructed local peacebuilding as such an unimportant, unfamiliar, and unmanageable task that neither shocking events nor resistance from select individuals could convince international actors to reevaluate their understanding of violence and intervention.