Emotion As Vrtue And Vice
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Virtue and Vice: Volume 15, Part 1
Author: Ellen Frankel Paul
language: en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date: 1998-02-13
The essays in this volume examine the nature of virtue and its role in moral theory.
Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic
Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic presents a series of essays by leading ethicists and epistemologists who offer the latest thinking on the moral and intellectual virtues and vices, the structure of virtue theory, and the connections between virtue and emotion. Cuts across two fields of philosophical inquiry by featuring a dual focus on ethics and epistemology Features cutting-edge work on the moral and intellectual virtues and vices, the structure of virtue theory, and the connections between virtue and emotion Presents a radical new moral theory that makes exemplars the foundation of ethics; and new theories of epistemic vices such as epistemic malevolence and epistemic self-indulgence Represents one of the few collections to address both the moral virtues and the epistemic virtues Explores a new approach in epistemology - virtue epistemology - which emphasizes the importance of intellectual character traits
Emotion and Virtue
Author: Gopal Sreenivasan
language: en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date: 2020-11-24
A novel approach to the crucial role emotion plays in virtuous action What must a person be like to possess a virtue in full measure? What sort of psychological constitution does one need to be an exemplar of compassion, say, or of courage? Focusing on these two examples, Emotion and Virtue ingeniously argues that certain emotion traits play an indispensable role in virtue. With exemplars of compassion, for instance, this role is played by a modified sympathy trait, which is central to enabling these exemplars to be reliably correct judges of the compassionate thing to do in various practical situations. Indeed, according to Gopal Sreenivasan, the virtue of compassion is, in a sense, a modified sympathy trait, just as courage is a modified fear trait. While he upholds the traditional definition of virtue as a species of character trait, Sreenivasan discards other traditional precepts. For example, he rejects the unity of the virtues and raises new questions about when virtue should be taught. Unlike orthodox virtue ethics, moreover, his account does not aspire to rival consequentialism and deontology. Instead Sreenivasan repudiates the ambitions of virtue imperialism. Emotion and Virtue makes significant contributions to moral psychology and the theory of virtue alike.