Dynamic Bi Level Optimal Toll Design Approach For Dynamic Traffic Networks

Dynamic Bi-level Optimal Toll Design Approach for Dynamic Traffic Networks

Bilevel Optimization

2019 marked the 85th anniversary of Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg’s habilitation thesis “Marktform und Gleichgewicht,” which formed the roots of bilevel optimization. Research on the topic has grown tremendously since its introduction in the field of mathematical optimization. Besides the substantial advances that have been made from the perspective of game theory, many sub-fields of bilevel optimization have emerged concerning optimal control, multiobjective optimization, energy and electricity markets, management science, security and many more. Each chapter of this book covers a specific aspect of bilevel optimization that has grown significantly or holds great potential to grow, and was written by top experts in the corresponding area. In other words, unlike other works on the subject, this book consists of surveys of different topics on bilevel optimization. Hence, it can serve as a point of departure for students and researchers beginning their research journey or pursuing related projects. It also provides a unique opportunity for experienced researchers in the field to learn about the progress made so far and directions that warrant further investigation. All chapters have been peer-reviewed by experts on mathematical optimization.

Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security

Maximizing reader insights into the interactions between game theory, excessive crowding and safety and security elements, this book establishes a new research angle by illustrating linkages between different research approaches and through laying the foundations for subsequent analysis. Congestion (excessive crowding) is defined in this work as all kinds of flows; e.g., road/sea/air traffic, people, data, information, water, electricity, and organisms. Analysing systems where congestion occurs – which may be in parallel, series, interlinked, or interdependent, with flows one way or both ways – this book puts forward new congestion models, breaking new ground by introducing game theory and safety/security into proceedings. Addressing the multiple actors who may hold different concerns regarding system reliability; e.g. one or several terrorists, a government, various local or regional government agencies, or others with stakes for or against system reliability, this book describes how governments and authorities may have the tools to handle congestion, but that these tools need to be improved whilst additionally ensuring safety and security against various threats. This game-theoretic analysis sets this book apart from the current congestion literature and ensures that the book will be of use to postgraduates, researchers, 3rd/4th-year undergraduates, policy makers, and practitioners.