Clientelism Interests And Democratic Representation


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Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation


Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation

Author: Simona Piattoni

language: en

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Release Date: 2001-09-10


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This book charts the evolution of clientelist practices in several western European countries. Through the historical and comparative analysis of countries as diverse as Sweden and Greece, England and Spain, France and Italy, Iceland and the Netherlands, the authors study both the "supply-side" and the "demand-side" of clientelism. This approach contends that clientelism is a particular mix of particularism and universalism, in which interests are aggregated at the level of the individual and his family "particularism," but in which all interests can potentially find expression and accommodation in "universalism."

Patrons, Clients and Policies


Patrons, Clients and Policies

Author: Herbert Kitschelt

language: en

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Release Date: 2007-03-29


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A study of patronage politics and the persistence of clientelism across a range of countries.

Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism


Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism

Author: Susan C. Stokes

language: en

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Release Date: 2013-09-23


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Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism studies distributive politics: how parties and governments use material resources to win elections. The authors develop a theory that explains why loyal supporters, rather than swing voters, tend to benefit from pork-barrel politics; why poverty encourages clientelism and vote buying; and why redistribution and voter participation do not justify non-programmatic distribution.