Autonomy Authority And Moral Responsibility
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Autonomy, Authority and Moral Responsibility
Author: T. May
language: en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date: 2013-03-14
Questions about the relationship between autonomy and authority are raised in nearly every area of moral philosophy. Although the most ob vious of these is political philosophy (especially the philosophy of law), the issues surrounding this relationship are by no means confined to this area. Indeed, as we shall see as this work progresses, the issues raised are central to moral psychology, religion, professional ethics, medical ethics, and the nature of moral systems generally. Although the title of this work is Autonomy. Authority and Moral Responsibility. we shall be concerned with the more general question about the relationship between autonomy (or self-direction) and exter nal influences, which I take to be any guide to behavior whose presence, content or substance is dependent upon something beyond the control of the agent. Something is beyond the control of the agent if the agent cannot determine whether or not it is present, what its content consists of, or whether or not (or in what way) it influences her. These "external" influences may include (but are not necessarily limited to) religious con victions (which guide behavior according to a doctrine whose content is established independently of the agent); moral obligations (which re quire action in accordance with some moral theory); and desires for ob jects or states of affairs whose presence (or absence) is beyond the con trol of the agent. Of course, external influences may also include the requirements of authority or law.
The Second-Person Standpoint
Author: Stephen Darwall
language: en
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Release Date: 2009-09-30
Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? The inability of philosophy to answer this question in a compelling manner—along with the moral skepticism and ethical confusion that ensue—result, Stephen Darwall argues, from our failure to appreciate the essentially interpersonal character of moral obligation. After showing how attempts to vindicate morality have tended to change the subject—falling back on nonmoral values or practical, first-person considerations—Darwall elaborates the interpersonal nature of moral obligations: their inherent link to our responsibilities to one another as members of the moral community. As Darwall defines it, the concept of moral obligation has an irreducibly second-person aspect; it presupposes our authority to make claims and demands on one another. And so too do many other central notions, including those of rights, the dignity of and respect for persons, and the very concept of person itself. The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality's supreme authority—an account that Darwall carries from the realm of theory to the practical world of second-person attitudes, emotions, and actions.
The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant's Moral Philosophy
Author: Stefano Bacin
language: en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date: 2019
A thorough study of why Kant developed the concept of autonomy, one of his central legacies for contemporary moral thought.