Automata Model For Congestion Prediction

Automata Model for Congestion Prediction

Advances and Applications in SmartRail, Traffic, and Transportation Engineering

This book is a collection of the original peer-reviewed conference papers presented at the 2024 2nd International Conference on SmartRail, Traffic, and Transportation Engineering, organized by Chongqing Jiaotong University and Southwest Jiaotong University. The conference will be held on 25-27 October 2024 in Chongqing, China. It covers topics including SmartRail systems, autonomous vehicles, energy efficiency, sustainable transportation, big data in transportation, and machine learning. Speakers discussed innovative technologies and strategies to improve the efficiency, reliability, and safety of rail networks while exploring the opportunities and challenges of integrating autonomous vehicles into existing transportation networks. It provides valuable insights into the latest developments and trends in transportation engineering and technology, with a focus on electrification and sustainable transportation. It serves as a valuable resource for professionals, researchers, and students working in the field.

Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security

Maximizing reader insights into the interactions between game theory, excessive crowding and safety and security elements, this book establishes a new research angle by illustrating linkages between different research approaches and through laying the foundations for subsequent analysis. Congestion (excessive crowding) is defined in this work as all kinds of flows; e.g., road/sea/air traffic, people, data, information, water, electricity, and organisms. Analysing systems where congestion occurs – which may be in parallel, series, interlinked, or interdependent, with flows one way or both ways – this book puts forward new congestion models, breaking new ground by introducing game theory and safety/security into proceedings. Addressing the multiple actors who may hold different concerns regarding system reliability; e.g. one or several terrorists, a government, various local or regional government agencies, or others with stakes for or against system reliability, this book describes how governments and authorities may have the tools to handle congestion, but that these tools need to be improved whilst additionally ensuring safety and security against various threats. This game-theoretic analysis sets this book apart from the current congestion literature and ensures that the book will be of use to postgraduates, researchers, 3rd/4th-year undergraduates, policy makers, and practitioners.